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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This working document is released in parallel  with the Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of 
macro-financial assistance to third countries in 2005 and is meant to complement it. 
It discusses the economic situation in the countries for which disbursements under 
previously decided operations have been made or are still outstanding in 2005. 
In line with the recommendations of the Court of Auditors in their special report of 
March 2002,  particular  attention  is  paid  to  the  relevant  aspects  of  the  transition 
process and of the implementation of structural reforms in the beneficiary countries. 
Progress in this respect also reflects the degree to which the corresponding economic 
policy conditions attached to the EC macro-financial assistance have been met.  
This  report  is  submitted  in  accordance  with  the  Council  Decisions  regarding 
Community macro-financial or exceptional financial assistance to third countries and 
follows on from the reports presented in previous years
1. 
The complete list of macro-financial assistance operations decided by the Council 
with the corresponding disbursements up to the end of 2005 appears in Annex, as 
well as well as statistical data of the related countries. 
                                                 
1  See the following Communications from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
with the title 'Report on the implementation of macro-financial assistance to third countries': 
COM(1992)400 of 16 September 1992. 
COM(1994)229 of 7 June 1994. 
COM(1995)572 of 27 November 1995. 
COM(1996)695 of 8 January 1997. 
COM(1998)3 of 13 January 1998. 
COM(1999)580 of 15 November 1999. 
COM(2000)682 of 27 October 2000. 
COM(2001)288 of 1 June 2001. 
COM(2002)352 of 11 July 2002. 
COM(2003)444 of 24 July 2003. 
COM(2004)523 of 28 July 2004. 
  COM(2005)245 of 8 June 2005  
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2.  ALBANIA 
2.1.  Executive summary 
GDP growth remained high at 5.5% in 2005. After the last cut of the main policy rate 
by 25 basis points to the current 5.0% in March 2005, the central bank continued to 
follow  a  neutral  course  of  monetary  policy,  aiming  at  stable  interest  rates.  The 
appreciation pressures of the Albanian lek against the euro eased towards the end of 
2005. Over the whole year, the lek appreciated against the euro in nominal terms by 
approximately  2.7%.  It  depreciated  vis-à-vis  the  USD  by  around  12.5% over  the 
same period. Large imbalances remain in the external sector. While the trade deficit 
is  estimated  to  have  remained  above  23%  of  GDP  in  2005,  substantial  private 
transfers  from abroad have contributed to finance a  current account deficit of an 
estimated 7.0% of GDP. Foreign direct investment dropped somewhat to 2.9% of 
GDP  in  2005  in  comparison  to  4.6%  of  GDP  in  2004  when  boosted  by  the 
privatisation of the Savings Bank. The privatisation and restructuring of remaining 
large  state-owned  enterprises  have  been  delayed,  in  particular  with  regard  to 
telecommunication  and  energy  utilities.  Some  progress  was  achieved  in  the 
management of public expenditures and revenues; nevertheless the strengthening of 
the  tax  administration  and  public  sector  governance  remain  ones  of  the  key 
challenges for the new Government.  
2.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Albania’s stable macroeconomic environment, characterised by strong GDP growth 
and subdued inflation, has been maintained in 2005. However, at the end of the year 
the country suffered from frequent power supply shortages for almost four months, 
mainly  as  a  result  of  the  strong  dependence  on  hydro  sources  for  generating 
electricity and the failure of tenders for purchasing sufficient electricity from abroad. 
Power  supply  cuts  hit  especially  small  businesses.  The  IMF  estimated  the 
repercussions of the crisis on economic growth at 0.5% of GDP in 2005 and at 1% in 
2006. Thus, the estimate of GDP growth has been revised to 5.5% in 2005 and is 
expected to further decline to 5.0% in 2006.  
The  labour  market  continued  to  slightly  improve  throughout  2005.  The 
unemployment rate (based on registered data) fell slightly from 14.4% at the end of 
2004 to 14.3% in June 2005 and further to estimated 14.2% in September 2005. This 
indicator provides however only limited information due to a significant informal 
sector and hidden unemployment in particular in agriculture, while some jobless fail 
to register. 
The  2005  budget  execution  has  been  better  than  planned  and  the  overall  budget 
deficit in 2005 is estimated at 3.8% of GDP. In October 2005, the IMF staff mission 
reached an agreement with the authorities on key parameters for the remainder of 
2005 and for the 2006 budget and the underlying macroeconomic and fiscal policy 
assumptions. It agreed on a two-step reduction of the tax burden: cuts in the small 
business tax from 3% to 1.5%, with implementation starting as of November 2005, to 
be  followed  by  a  reduction  of  the  corporate  profit  tax  from  23%  to  20%,  to  be 
implemented  as  of  January  2006.  The  2006  budget,  adopted  by  Parliament  in 
December 2005, is based on conservative revenue projections and does not include  
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possible gains from the tax administration reform measures. Furthermore, the 2006 
budget contains a contingency of 0.75% of GDP to be released only in the second 
half of the year, provided budget performance is favourable for the first half of the 
year. The overall budget deficit for 2006 is foreseen at 4.1% of GDP. 
Inflation continued to follow an upwards trend since July 2005, when CPI inflation 
reached a low of 1.8% (y-o-y). It gradually increased to 3.0% (y-o-y) in November 
2005  due  to  persistent  pressure  from  rising  oil  prices.  The  latter  was  somewhat 
moderated by the continuing appreciation of the Albanian lek vis-à-vis the euro, in 
particular  in  the  first  semester  of  2005.  Annual inflation  stood  at 2.2%  in  2005, 
remaining at the lower end of the Bank of Albania’s informal 2-4% inflation target 
range. The Bank of Albania currently examines prerequisites for a gradually move to 
a formal inflation targeting regime with the aim of enhancing the transparency and 
credibility of its monetary policies. 
The IMF foresees a widening of the trade deficit to about 23% of GDP in 2005 and 
2006. The current account deficit is estimated at 7% of GDP in 2005 and is expected 
to widen to 8.1% of GDP in 2006. Financing of the trade deficit still largely depends 
on significant remittances and other current transfers, estimated at 14% of GDP in 
2005.  Less  than  half  of  the  current  account  deficit  is  covered  by  foreign  direct 
investment, estimated at 2.9% of GDP in 2005 and 3.2% of GDP in 2006. Based on 
the  last  IMF  estimates,  residual  balance-of-payments  needs  are  estimated  at 
EUR 24 million (0.4% of GDP) in 2005 and at EUR 38 million (0.5% of GDP) in 
2006, over and above financing provided by IFIs. Balance-of-payments projections 
will be further monitored by the IMF, and may hence be updated again. 
2.3.  Structural reforms 
Progress in public administration reform has continued, the administrative capacity 
of the tax administration has further improved and several crucial reforms have been 
put  in  place  throughout  2005.  In  the  field  of  financial  control  and  audit,  some 
significant  progress  has  been  achieved.  However  revenue  collection  and  public 
expenditure  management  remained  weak,  revealing  significant  inefficiencies 
particularly in some of the social and infrastructure sectors. A strengthening of the 
tax administration remains also at the core of the fiscal strategy, as well as the fight 
against tax evasion, fraud and corruption, and the improvement of the VAT system.  
Whereas privatisation of small- and medium-sized enterprises has been completed, 
large-scale privatisation has suffered delays. The ratification of the sale agreement 
that would complete the privatisation of Albtelecom was rejected by the Albanian 
Parliament in October 2005, calling for a review of the sale contract and the whole 
tender  procedure.  The  attempt  to  sell  a  majority  stake  in  ARMO  to  a  strategic 
investor in May 2005 failed due to a lack of any market interest. 
2.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In  April  2004,  the  Council  decided  to  provide  Albania  with  macro-financial 
assistance of up to EUR 25 million, including EUR 16 million of grants and EUR 9 
million of loans. The aim of this assistance is to ease Albania’s external financing 
constraints, to support its balance of payments and to strengthen its foreign exchange 
position.  The  release  of  this  assistance  was  postponed  to  2005,  given  the  more  
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favourable than anticipated balance-of-payments developments in 2004, provided it 
remains  necessary  to  finance  external  account  needs.  Negotiations  on  a 
Memorandum of Understanding, which defines the conditionality applying to this 
assistance, were successfully concluded in October 2004 (the MoU was signed in 
May  2005).  The  focus  of  this  conditionality  is  on  the  areas  of  public  finance 
management,  public  administration  and  financial  sector  reform,  as  well  as  on 
improving the business environment and private sector development.  
In March 2004, an operational assessment of the reliability of financial circuits and 
procedures at the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Albania was carried out by the 
Commission  assisted  by  an  external  consultant.  This  assessment  concluded  that 
despite some administrative weaknesses in the Ministry of Finance, a framework for 
sound  financial  management  at  both  authorities  is  effective.  In  order  to  further 
strengthening this framework, the main related recommendations of the operational 
assessment  were  reflected  in  the  conditionality  of  the  Memorandum  of 
Understanding.  Upon  the  fulfilment  of  the  corresponding  conditions,  the  grant 
component of the first tranche of EUR 3 million was disbursed in November 2005. 
The disbursement of the loan component of the first tranche of EUR 9 million is 
expected to be completed in the first quarter 2006.  
In  November  2005,  Commission  services  carried  out  a  mission  to  review  the 
conditionality attached to the EUR 13 million second tranche of this assistance. The 
mission found that good progress had been achieved or was ongoing in several areas. 
However, more action was still needed to fully meet a number of the conditions and 
further monitoring will be carried out in the first half of 2006.   
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Summary Status of Economic Reform  
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most price categories are liberalised except for some public services and utilities. Prices of electricity and oil 
have been increased towards cost recovery levels under the oversight of the Regulatory Authority. Electricity 
prices for poor families are however still subsidised. Pricing for telecommunication is fully liberalised, even 
for international calls. Railway transport prices remain subsidized. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Albania is a WTO member since 2000 and has concluded Free Trade Agreements negotiations with the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244), Romania, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
3.  Exchange regime 
Albania maintains a managed floating exchange rate regime. However, the Bank of Albania intervenes when 
necessary to smooth out strong fluctuations. The appreciation pressures of the Albanian lek against the euro 
eased towards the end of the year. Over the whole year, the lek appreciated against the euro in nominal terms 
by approximately 2.7%. It depreciated vis-à-vis the USD by around 12.5% over the same period. 
4.  Foreign Direct Investment 
In 2005, foreign direct investment decreased somewhat to EUR 197 million (about 2.9% of GDP) against 
EUR 277 million (about 4.6% of GDP) in 2004. The number of administrative barriers to establish a business 
in Albania remains high and together with uninviting general business environment continue to represent 
major impediments for a substantial inflow of foreign investment. 
5.  Monetary policy 
The Bank of Albania continued with its stability-oriented monetary policy in 2005 and maintained its 2-4% 
inflation  target.  After  the  last  cut  of  the  main  policy  rate  by  25  basis  points  to  the  current  5.0%  in 
March 2005, the central bank continued to follow a  neutral course of  monetary policy, aiming at stable 
interest rates.  
6.  Public Finance 
The performance in terms of revenue collection has been improved compared to previous years, but still 
remained below needs given the country’s weak tax revenue base. In October 2005, the IMF staff mission 
reached an agreement with the authorities on key parameters of the remainder of 2005 and 2006 budget and 
the underlying macroeconomic and fiscal policy assumptions, including a set of tax administration reform 
measures. 
7.  Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
Privatisation in Albania gained some momentum with the successful sale of the Savings Bank to Raiffeisen 
Bank in early 2004. Nevertheless the process of restructuring and privatisation of large companies such as of 
Albtelekom and ARMO (fuel company) has been delayed.  
8.  Financial Sector Reform 
The successful privatisation of the Savings Bank, together with steps taken to privatise the main Albanian 
insurance company, INSIG, represented considerable progress towards the completion of the privatisation of 
the financial sector. The banking sector is now close to 100% in private hands.   
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3.  ARMENIA 
3.1.  Executive summary 
The Armenian economy continued recent years strong growth in 2005 and surpassed 
the pre-transition level of GDP. Real GDP growth reached 10.5% while the sector 
composition of economic growth shifted slightly with a strong boom in construction 
(+31.2%) continued growth in agricultural production (+11.8%) and renewed growth 
in  industrial  production  (+6.2%).  The appreciation  of  the  Armenian  dram  has 
contributed to a marked decrease in consumer price inflation (0.6% in 2005 down 
from 7.0% in 2004).  
There has been gradual progress in structural reforms, but although Armenia is in 
front  among  CIS  countries  on  most  dimensions of  structural  reforms,  the  overall 
business environment is not yet fully conducive to more broadly based economic 
growth.  
Armenia implemented satisfactorily the economic programme supported by the IMF. 
The  IMF  in  May  2005  approved  a  three  year  arrangement  under  the  Poverty 
Reduction  and  Growth  Facility  (PRGF)  to  support  the  government's  economic 
program through 2008. The EC disbursed a grant instalment of EUR 1.5 million to 
Armenia in December 2005 after the country made a principal repayment of EUR 2 
million to the Community. Armenia has no further outstanding debt to the EC.  
3.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Real GDP growth increased slightly in 2005 to about 10.5% following several years 
of  strong  economic  performance  (10.0%  in  2004).  Construction,  agriculture  and 
services were driving the economy while industrial production posted more modest 
growth at 6.2%. Processing of diamonds accounted for about 39% of exports in 2005 
(about  42%  in  2004).  New  investments  are  likely  to  contribute  to  a  gradual 
diversification of exports in coming years. Despite the strong growth performance, 
officially registered unemployment continued to decline quite slowly (from 9.4% in 
2004 to 8.9% in 2005) while the ILO-compatible unemployment level indicated by 
household surveys is much higher. 
The overall fiscal balance is on a sound basis with an estimated deficit of about 2.4% 
of GDP. The tax revenues-to-GDP ratio is estimated at 14.5% (14.1% in 2004). A 
corporate tax rate of 1% of company turnover was introduced in January 2005 and a 
list  naming  the  300  top  tax  payers  was  published  in  April 2005  (aimed  at 
embarrassing the wealthiest tax evaders), with the aim to boost taxes. Nevertheless, 
at  about  15.6%,  total  revenues  and  grants  as  a  percentage  of  GDP  are  almost 
unchanged since 2004 and still below their 2003 level because of a  reduction in 
grants.  The  nominal  increase  in  current  expenditure  (+15%)  was  directed  in 
particular to finance a rise in social spending in line with priorities set in the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper. The 2006 budget likewise foresee a significant increase in 
social spending and defence spending.  
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The  12-month  inflation  decelerated  from  4.9%  in  January  to  -0.2%  in 
December 2005. By allowing the dram to appreciate, the Central Bank of Armenia 
curbed inflationary expectations and reduced inflation below its target inflation rate 
of  3%.  Despite  the  real  effective  appreciation  of  the  dram,  the  loss  of 
competitiveness is still considered to be relatively moderate given a real depreciation 
of around 25% in 2000-2003.  
The recent appreciation of the dram is driven by a rise in FDI, workers’ remittances 
and other private transfers. According to preliminary estimates, the current account 
deficit narrowed to 3.9% of GDP in 2005 (4.6% in 2004). The trade deficit narrowed 
slightly to about 12% of GDP. Goods and services imports growth (+20.2%) slightly 
exceeded  exports  growth  (+19.8%).  Foreign  direct  investment  increased  to  about 
USD 255 million (food industry, communications, construction and transport being 
the  prominent  sectors)  from  USD 217  million  in  2004.  The  gross  international 
reserves of the Central Bank of Armenia are comfortably high covering four months 
of imports. In nominal terms the public external debt increased to about USD 1.2 
billion, while as a ratio to GDP it is estimated at about 29% (down from about 31% 
in 2004).  
Armenia implemented satisfactorily the economic programme supported by the IMF. 
The IMF Executive Board concluded in December 2004 the final review under the 
first  PRGF-supported  three-year  arrangement.  A  second  three  year  arrangement 
under the PRGF was approved in May 2005 to support the government's economic 
program  through  2008.  The  total  available  amount  of  disbursements  under  this 
PRGF-arrangement is SDR 23 million with SDR 3.28 million disbursed after the first 
review  in  November  2005.  The  World  Bank  Country  Assistance  Strategy  for 
Armenia approved in 2004 provide for IDA lending of USD 170 million over four 
years.  The  total  amount  could  be  increased  up  to  USD  220  million  if  the 
improvements  in  public  finance  management  accelerate  in  Armenia.  The  World 
Bank focuses on reducing non-income aspects of poverty (such as access to basic 
services) and making economic growth overall more beneficial to the poor. 
3.3.  Structural reform 
There  has  been  gradual  progress  in  structural  reforms,  but  the  overall  business 
environment  is  not  yet  fully  conducive  to  more  broadly  based  economic  growth, 
though Armenia is in front among CIS countries on most dimensions of structural 
reforms. Bureaucracy, corruption and limited access to finance is still perceived to 
weight on the business climate. This is confirmed by the World Bank's governance 
indicators that show continued problems with rule of law, government effectiveness, 
corruption  and  political  stability.  The  business  climate  remains  difficult  for  new 
small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  in  particular.  The  highly  concentrated  firm 
structure in the formal economy is dominated by vested interests. Steps were taken in 
the  implementation  and  monitoring  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Strategy  but  the 
government’s commitment was perceived fairly weak. 
Due to persistent weaknesses in tax and customs administration, the gap between 
actual and potential revenue collection remains large. A risk-based customs clearance 
programme  was  introduced  in  November  2005.  This  follows  an  increased  use  of 
transaction prices instead of reference prices for assessment of import declarations.  
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These steps should help to push forward a more efficient and transparent customs 
clearance. 
The  Central  Bank  of  Armenia  (CBA)  continued  to  strengthen  supervision  and 
regulations in the banking sector. The minimum capital requirement was raised to the 
equivalent of USD 5 million from USD 2 million in July 2005, and this seems to 
have advanced some consolidation in the sector. A deposit insurance scheme was 
also launched in July 2005. Supervision of banks will be upgraded significantly in 
2006 in line with FSAP recommendations. Financial depth is increasing, but access 
to  finance  is  still  limited.  The  efficiency  of  financial  intermediation  needs  to  be 
improved, as indicated by the still high interest rate spread, which fell from 13.7% in 
2004 to 12.2% in 2005. Transparency and efficiency need to be addressed seriously 
also in the judicial system to encourage deepening of the financial intermediation and 
new business development. Total bank assets are at a low level equivalent to about 
19% of GDP (2005 figure not available yet). 
Despite having a liberal trade regime, Armenia has not been able to fully benefit 
from increased trade opportunities after it became a WTO member in February 2003 
because  of  its  isolated  position,  high  transportation  costs  and  shortcomings  in 
customs procedures. In an attempt to diversify both exports and imports, Armenia 
has strengthened trade relations with Iran. A gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia is 
under construction and is expected to be completed in early 2007.  
3.4.  Implementation of exceptional financial assistance 
The EC’s exceptional financial assistance programme was completed in 2005 with 
the disbursement of the final grant instalment of EUR 1.5 million in December. The 
payment followed Armenia’s repayment in November 2005 of all outstanding debt of 
EUR 2 million to the Community. Upon clearing all arrears vis-à-vis the Community 
in 1998, Armenia had benefited from a loan of EUR 28 million which the country 
has now fully repaid through early principal repayments. The total available amount 
of the grant element, EUR 30 million, was disbursed in altogether 6 instalments over 
the period 1998-2005. Satisfactory progress was made in structural reforms also in 
2005 so that the Commission could release the final grant instalment without any 
waivers. 
The structural policy conditionality for this final grant instalment was largely based 
on  an  operational  assessment  on  the  soundness  of  Armenia’s  public  finance 
management that was carried out in April 2004. In April 2005, the Commission, 
assisted by external experts, carried out a follow-up assessment which concluded that 
significant progress had been made in several areas. An internal audit development 
unit has been established in the Ministry of Finance and Economy to oversee the 
implementation  of  the  Government  Strategy  for  Development  of  Internal  Audit 
System in 2005-2008. The positions of chief auditors, created in 2004, have been 
filled for the most part in line ministries and a training and certification programme 
is  in  place  supported  by  donor-assistance.  The  adoption  of  amendments  to  the 
Constitution  in  a  national  referendum  in  November  2005  paves  the  way  for  the 
modernisation of the legal framework for independent external audits by Armenia’s 
supreme audit institution, the Chamber of Control. Other areas of progress include 
putting  in  place  a  regular  reporting  mechanism  for  government-owned  non- 
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commercial  organisations  (former  budget  organisations)  on  their  revenues  and 
expenditure. 
In the context of the exceptional financial assistance, the Commission continued to 
monitor tax and customs issues which have been raised by the EU side on a number 
of occasions in meetings under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
The government adopted an action plan for tax and customs reforms (2005-2006) 
aiming at increasing tax buoyancy. The authorities’ decision to publish a list of the 
300 largest taxpayers in April 2005 was a commendable initiative to improve tax 
compliance. In customs administration, progress albeit rather slowly has been made 
to  comply  with  Armenia’s  WTO  undertakings  in  customs  valuation  and  in  post 
clearance  verification.  Significant  progress  was  made  by  the  Central  Bank  of 
Armenia over 2005 in the implementation of the new anti-money laundering law 
adopted at the end of 2004.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation 
No administratively set prices other than for utilities exist. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Liberal  trade  policy.  Simple  and  relatively  open  import  regime  with  a  low  average 
(about 3%) tariff structure. No quantitative restrictions. Accession to the WTO effective in 
February 2003. 
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
Floating exchange rate of the dram with limited official intervention by the Central Bank 
of  Armenia.  No  restrictions  on  current  international  transfers  in  conformity  with 
Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement.  
4.  Foreign direct investment 
Liberal policy towards foreign direct investment. Absence of restrictions on repatriation of 
profits and capital. Net FDI inflows about 6% of GDP (2004).  
5.  Monetary policy 
Low inflation environment maintained through prudent monetary policies conducted by 
the Central Bank of Armenia. 
6.  Public finances 
Total fiscal revenues incl. grants estimated at around 15.6% of GDP (2005), of which tax 
revenues  about  14.5%  of  GDP.  Total  expenditure  estimated  at  about  18%  of  GDP. 
Medium-term expenditure framework has been integrated to the annual budget process, 
and a second generation treasury reform is underway.  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
Private sector accounts for about 75% of GDP and employment. Most of commercially 
viable state-owned enterprises have been privatised (approx. 7300 small enterprises and 
2000 medium and large scale enterprises). 
8.  Financial sector reform 
The minimum capital requirement was raised to the equivalent of USD 5 million and a 
deposit insurance scheme became operational in July 2005.   
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4.  BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
4.1.  Executive summary 
Bosnia and Herzegovina maintained a stable macroeconomic environment in 2005, 
with  the  economy  growing  at  around  5%  as  in  2004.  Inflation  picked  up  from 
previous  low  levels,  mainly  as  a  result  of  higher  energy  prices  and  changes  in 
administered prices. Despite the improving exports performance, external imbalances 
continue to be very large, mainly a result of high imports and limited export capacity 
of the country. Exports growth was driven by increased prices and volumes for metal 
and mineral products while the overall dynamism of the economy remained rather 
weak. Structural reforms continued to be rather slow, although some achievements 
were noted in the fields of indirect taxation and privatisation.  
In  the  course  of  2005  the  November  2002  Council  Decision,  as  amended  in 
December 2004  to  extend  its  expiry  date  until  2005,  and  providing  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina with up to EUR 60 million of macro-financial assistance, came to its 
final  stage  of  implementation.  The  first  two  tranches  had  been  disbursed  in 
February 2002  and in  December 2003/January 2004 respectively, after satisfactory 
compliance  with  the  attached  conditionality.  The  grant  part  of  the  third  tranche, 
amounting  to  EUR 15  million,  was  released  in  June 2005.  The release  of  the 
corresponding loan part of EUR 10 million was delayed pending ratification of the 
loan by the BiH State Parliament and foreseen to take place in the beginning of 2006.  
4.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
After a dip in the GDP growth rate in 2003, growth picked up during 2004 to around 
5% of GDP and is estimated to have stayed at a similar level in 2005. Industrial 
production continued to grow rather strongly in 2005, although at a slightly lower 
pace than in 2004, by around 10%. The increase in industrial production was mainly 
driven by output growth in the mining and processing industries, in particular in the 
Republika Srbska.  
After three years of annual inflation rates below 1%, inflation surged in 2005 to 3.1% 
in September (y-o-y). The increase was mainly due to higher energy prices and price 
hikes for certain regulated prices. Inflation is expected to have continued to increase 
in the beginning of 2006 due to the introduction of VAT by first of January 2006 and 
related price increases. Through the Currency Board arrangement the Convertible 
Mark (KM) has been pegged to the euro at an unchanged rate since the introduction 
of  the  euro  in  January 1999.  Despite  some  degree  of  fiscal  consolidation  and 
expenditure  reduction  which  took  place  during  the  past  years,  the  size  of  public 
spending remains comparatively high at around 50% of GDP.  
The  external  imbalances  continue  to  be  large,  mainly  driven  by  a  sizeable  trade 
deficit. Imports amounted to over 80% of GDP in 2004. Exports have been growing 
strongly,  although  from  a  relatively  low  basis,  and  increased  by  22%  in 
September 2005 year-on-year. Import growth also accelerated, although less rapidly, 
from 7.6% in 2004 to 11% in September 2005 (y-o-y). Export growth was largely 
attributed  to  volume  and  price  increases  for  metal  and  mineral  products,  which 
accounted for over 40% of total  exports during the period January to  September  
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2005, while dynamism in other sectors remained rather weak. The current account 
deficit remained very large and according to Central Bank data stood at around 23% 
of  GDP  in  March  2005,  but  is  likely  to  have  decreased  somewhat  during  the 
remainder of 2005. BiH experienced strong FDI inflows in 2004 of over 7% of GDP, 
mainly due to a few large privatisation deals. During the first three quarters of 2005, 
inflows  continued  to  be  rather  strong  and  roughly  equalled  the  same  amount  in 
nominal Euro-terms as for the same period the year before.  
External debt has been on the decline over the last years and is estimated to have 
equalled 30.7% of GDP at end 2005, down from 32.7% the year before. However, an 
agreement on how to restructure and repay outstanding domestic debt claims still 
remains  to  be  reached.  After  the  courts  struck  down  a  previous  proposal  to 
restructure the debt at a net present value of 10% of GDP, any future deal is likely to 
be highly costly and increase the debt burden significantly. 
4.3.  Structural reforms 
An important area of reform has been indirect taxation and the creation of an Indirect 
Tax Authority (the ITA). The ITA board, comprising the finance ministers at Entity 
and State levels and their respective experts, started functioning during the first half 
of 2004 and was responsible for the introduction on 1
st of January 2006 of a single 
VAT rate of 17%. The introduction went rather smoothly and is an important step to 
harmonise indirect taxation between the entities and to improve revenue collection.  
Privatisation process remained slow in 2005, although some progress was achieved 
in  particular  in  the  Republika  Srbska.  Complicated  organisational  structures  as 
regards the responsibilities for privatisation, vested interests and the financial status 
of companies have slowed down the process. Loss-making public companies are a 
source of inefficient use of public resources, which negatively affects savings and 
investment.  Improved  bankruptcy  legislation  has  been  adopted  but  its application 
remains limited.  
The banking system is one of the sectors in BiH were the most rapid reforms and 
structural transformation have taken place. By end 2003, 90% of total capital in the 
banking  sector  was  in  private  hands  and  the  sector  is  at  present  dominated  by 
foreign-owned banks. The regulatory framework as well as the enforcement of rules 
by the supervisory authorities has continued to be strengthened and most banks now 
participate in the Deposit Insurance Scheme.  
4.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In November 2002 the Council approved Community macro-financial assistance of 
up to EUR 60 million to BiH (Decision 2002/883/EC), comprising a loan element of 
up to EUR 20 million and a grant element of up to EUR 40 million. In order to allow 
the full implementation of this assistance, and given the expiry of the initial Council 
Decision on 9 November 2004, the Commission proposed in September an extension 
of this assistance until 30 June 2005, which the Council approved on 7 December 
2004 (Council Decision 2004/861/EC)
 2. 
                                                 
2  OJ L 370/80  
EN  17    EN 
The first tranche was disbursed in February 2003 (EUR 15 million grant), following 
the approval by the IMF board of a new stand-by arrangement and the signature by 
the Commission and the BiH authorities of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
laying out the conditionality attached to the first two tranches. The second tranche 
was released in December 2003 (EUR 10 million grant) and January 2004 (EUR 10 
million loan).  
In June 2003, a Supplemental Memorandum of understanding was signed, outlining 
the economic policy conditions attached to the release of the third and last tranche of 
up  to  EUR  25  million.  The  conditions  covered  the  areas  of  public  finance  and 
administration  reform,  private  sector  and  business  environment,  financial  sector 
reform  and  the  area  of  statistics.  After  the  performance  of  an  “operational 
assessment”, assessing the soundness of BiH’s financial circuits and administrative 
controls, in August 2004 the Commission requested actions prior to the disbursement 
of the third tranche. In May 2005 conditions and additional prior actions related to 
the release of the third tranche were considered as fulfilled and the grant part of this 
last tranche was disbursed in mid 2005. The disbursement of the loan component of 
the third tranche required the adoption of the loan agreement in the BiH Parliament 
which has delayed its disbursement until February 2006.  
The operation has thereby come to an end.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation  
Regulated prices largely prevail for utilities and infrastructure as well as in some other areas. 
Price regulations are decided upon separately in the two entities and are also in certain areas 
handled on municipality and cantonal level.  
2.  Trade liberalisation  
BiH has started its process of negotiation to join the World Trade Organisation and has signed all 
the FTAs foreseen by the Stability Pact’s Memorandum of Understanding on trade.  
3.  Exchange regime  
Since June 1998 BiH has a Currency Board Arrangement under which the national currency, the 
Convertible Mark (KM), is pegged to the Euro at the fixed rate of 1.96 KM.  
4.  Foreign direct investment  
FDI inflows have increased significantly over the last years and amounted to around 7% of GDP 
in 2004. However, FDI in 2004 and 2005 has largely been related to a rather small number of 
privatisation  transactions  and  the  investment  climate  is  still  hampered  by  the  weak  business 
climate and partly inconsistent frameworks between the two entities.  
5.  Monetary policy  
The Central Bank of BiH is responsible for operating the Currency Board Arrangement and this 
arrangement limits the scope of monetary policy. The CBBH and other banks are prohibited from 
lending money to the government.  
6.  Public finances  
The share of public spending in GDP has been on a declining trend over the last years but remains 
large  at  around  50%  of  GDP  (not  taking  the  informal  economy  into  account)  and  public 
expenditure is often associated with large inefficiencies. However, significant fiscal consolidation 
has been achieved over time, together with tax harmonisation between entities. Important customs 
and taxation reforms, including VAT introduction, has been introduced. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
The privatisation process has been slow, although some successful sales in particular the metal 
and mining sectors were achieved in 2004 and some further progress was made, in particular in 
the  Republika  Srbska,  during  2005.  Complicated  organisational  structures  as  regards  the 
responsibilities  for  privatisation,  vested  interests  and  the  weak  financial  standing  of  many 
companies have impeded the process.. 
8.  Financial sector reform  
Banking  supervision  has  continued  to  be  strengthened  and  regulation  improved.  A  Deposit 
Insurance Scheme covers  most banks. The banking sectors in the two entities are still partly 
fragmented and are supervision in the two entities is not fully integrated.   
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5.  GEORGIA 
5.1.  Executive summary 
Economic growth accelerated somewhat in 2005 to around 8% (6.2% in 2004) owing 
to strong performance of both industry and agriculture. The BTC oil pipeline was 
completed and a parallel gas pipeline from the Caspian Sea through Georgia to the 
Mediterranean is due to become operational in 2007. The privatisation process took 
off last year, bringing revenues equivalent to approximately 3% of GDP (0.9% in 
2004). 
As  a  result  of  better  coordination  of  fiscal  and  monetary  policies,  inflation 
decelerated towards the end of the year, with annual inflation of 6.2% in December 
(7.5% in December 2004). The current account deficit widened to an estimated 12% 
of GDP (7.6% in 2004) owing to large inflows of capital goods for pipeline and other 
infrastructure  investment.  The  deficit  was  covered  by  inflows  of  foreign  direct 
investment. 
The  Government’s  reform  programme  continues  to  receive  strong  financial  and 
technical  support  from  the  international  community.  Georgia  resumed  borrowing 
from  the  IMF  in  June  2004.  The  second  review  under  the  three-year  PRGF 
arrangement was completed in July 2005. The World Bank approved in August 2005 
a new Country Partnership Strategy for Georgia. In November 2005, the EU started 
consultations  with  Georgia  on  an  Action  Plan  for  the  European  Neighbourhood 
Policy.  
In  January  2006,  the  Council  decided  to  provide  macro-financial  assistance  to 
Georgia in a total amount of EUR 33.5 million in grants over a two-year period. As 
part of the preparations for the assistance, the Commission carried out in 2005 a 
follow-up assessment on Georgia’s public finance management reforms. 
5.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
According  to  preliminary  estimates,  real  GDP  growth  accelerated  to  about  8% 
in 2005 (compared to a revised real GDP growth rate of 6.2% for 2004). Industrial 
production  performed  particularly  strongly  (+18%  year-on-year  in  January-
September 2005) while the agricultural sector (accounting for about 16% of GDP) 
recovered after harsh weather conditions of 2004 (+5.2% year-on-year in January-
September)  The  large  oil  and  gas  pipeline  projects  continued  to  have  spill  over 
effects in the services sector which nevertheless remains a relatively small sector. 
The  strong  economic  growth  of  recent  years  has  not  reduced  unemployment, 
however,  because  of  on-going  large-scale  restructuring  and  retrenchment  in  the 
public sector which has not been matched by private sector job creation. In 2005, the 
unemployment rate was approaching 14%. 
The authorities eased the fiscal stance in 2005 against a backdrop of continued strong 
performance  in  tax  revenue  collection  and  the  projected  windfall  of  privatisation 
revenues. Because of inflationary pressures (consumer price inflation reaching 9.4% 
year-on-year in the first half of 2005), the government decided however to delay the 
payment  of  remaining  domestic  expenditure  arrears  till  2006.  Tax  revenues  as  a  
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percentage of GDP remained broadly unchanged at about 18% of GDP despite lower 
tax rates of the new tax code which became effective in January 2005. Revenue 
growth outperforming the realised expenditure growth, the initially projected fiscal 
deficit of 4.8% of GDP on cash basis was reduced to below 1%. 
Domestic public debt was reduced to about 8% of GDP (10.6% the year before) as 
the  government  had  access  to  concessional  external  financing,  notably  from  the 
World Bank. Yields on treasury bills were at around 14% in December 2005. The 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  National  Bank  of  Georgia (NBG)  look  for  ways  to 
develop  a  government  bond  market,  starting  with  a  conversion  of  existing 
government debt to the central bank into marketable securities. This would also help 
develop the central bank’s monetary policy instruments. 
Supported by re-monetisation, the NBG has maintained a prudent monetary policy 
stance. In 2005 the Georgian lari remained broadly stable in nominal and real terms 
after a sharp appreciation in 2004. The 12-month consumer price inflation peaked at 
10.3%  in  April  2005  but  decelerated  then  to  6.2%  in  December 2005  (7.5%  in 
December 2004). Following increases in oil and food prices, the authorities became 
concerned  with  the  inflationary  risks  in  mid-2005  and  earlier  fiscal  easing  and 
accommodating monetary policy were readjusted accordingly in the second half of 
the year. Typical for many transition economies, dollarisation is persistent also in 
Georgia, but on a declining trend at about 70% at end-2005 (86% in 2003). 
The  increase  in  the  current  account  deficit  in  2005  was  expected  given  the  high 
import demand for the  construction of the oil and gas pipelines as well as other 
infrastructure investments. The increase in the trade deficit was however balanced to 
some  extent  by  strong  growth  in  workers’  remittances  (+60%  in 2005),  most  of 
which  originates  from  Russia.  According  to  preliminary  estimates,  the  current 
account  deficit  was  about  10%  of  GDP  (7.6%  in  2004).  The  gross  international 
reserves of the NBU increased substantially during 2005, but still covered only about 
two months of imports at the end of the year.  
Georgia’s external debt decreased in nominal terms to USD 1.65 billion at the end of 
2005, while as a ratio to GDP the external debt is estimated to have decreased further 
from 33.6% (2004) to about 27% (2005). Georgia has concluded agreements with 
nearly all bilateral official creditors in line with the July 2004 Paris Club agreement 
which reduced significantly Georgia’s debt service over three years. The Paris Club 
creditors  also  expressed  their  willingness  to  consider  a  debt  treatment  under  the 
Evian  Approach  on  terms  tailored  to  Georgia’s  debt  situation  after  the  current 
agreement expires provided that Georgia has demonstrated a satisfactory track record 
by  that  time.  Given  its  present  access  to  concessional  loans  on  IDA  terms,  the 
government has refrained from all commercial borrowing.  
In  preparation  for  Georgia’s  future  access  to  international  capital  markets,  the 
authorities deemed appropriate to seek a sovereign credit rating. In December 2005, 
the  Standard  &  Poor’s  rating  agency  assigned  its  B+  long-term  rating  to  the 
government of Georgia with a positive outlook. The S&P stated that Georgia’s rating 
is supported by the government’s strong political commitment to prudent financial 
policies and market-oriented structural changes. The present rating is constrained by 
the short track record of political and economic stability, “together with uncertainties  
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connected with regional conflicts that may endanger the pace of reform or decrease 
investor interest in the region”. 
5.3.  Structural reform 
During  the  second  year  in  office  the  new  post-Rose  Revolution  government 
continued to make progress in structural reforms, presenting a growing legislative 
agenda to the parliament. A new licensing law was passed in July 2005 reducing 
drastically the number of licensed business operations from 900 to 150. The law on 
entrepreneurship  was  amended  to  streamline  registration  requirements  for  new 
businesses and eliminating the interference by courts in the process. The import tariff 
structure was simplified in line with WTO accession commitments in January 2005 
and a further reduction in the number of tariff bands and maximum tariff rates is 
planned for 2007/2008. A new Customs Code was submitted to the parliament in 
September  2005,  but  not  yet  adopted,  while  work  on  secondary  legislation  on 
customs  administration  continued.  The  new  Customs  Code  is  expected  to  reduce 
hurdles in transit trade which is an important service sector in Georgia. Corruption 
and  smuggling  in  customs  and  tax  administration  have  been  tackled  by  the 
authorities. Now the initial progress in enforcement needs to be consolidated through 
a  comprehensive  reform  process  so  that  a  significant  reduction  in  the  shadow 
economy  is  achieved.  According  to  official  estimates  some  30%  of  economic 
activities remain in the shadow. 
Initial rehabilitation projects helped to achieve to a more reliable electricity supply in 
2005, but substantial new investments over several years is required to secure the 
situation and to meet a growing demand. Quasi-fiscal deficit of the energy remains at 
around  4%  of  GDP.  The  authorities  have  been  working  on  a  new  energy  tariff 
structure.  Privatisation  of  regional  distribution  companies  and  power  generation 
companies  is  also  an  important  part  of  the  government’s  strategy.  Technical  and 
financial viability of gas distribution is a particular concern. Some improvements 
could  be  expected  after  the  bankruptcy  proceedings  of  Tbilisi’s  gas  distribution 
company and its subsequent acquisition by a Kazakh state-owned company decided 
in December 2005. The gas pipeline for imports from Russia will be rehabilitated 
with assistance from the United States and the construction of the South Caucasus 
Pipeline  from  Azerbaijan  is  also  progressing.  Following  the  recent  drastic  price 
increase  on  imported  gas,  the  government  decided  to  subsidise  households’ 
consumption  in 2006  while  more  viable  solutions  to  improve  the  overall  energy 
security and viability are being sought.  
In July 2005 the parliament adopted a law on the privatisation of agricultural land. 
As a next step, a functioning land market is needed to help farmers increase the size 
of their land holdings which is now one of the major obstacles in addition to access 
to financing. Privatisation of large state-owned enterprises accelerated so that total 
privatisation proceeds reached approximately 3% of GDP in 2005 (0.9% in 2004). 
Hasty privatisation procedures were however criticized for lack of transparency and 
coherent management. The controversies were partly due to the weaknesses of the 
privatisation law. Foreign direct investment was still dominated by the oil and gas 
pipelines, but the banking sector also started to attract some foreign investment in 
2005.  
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A national anti-corruption strategy was prepared in 2005 focusing on reforms in civil 
service, procurement, internal and external audit, tax administration and regulatory 
barriers faced by businesses as well as the functioning of law enforcement bodies. 
According  to  the  Transparency  International’s  2005  Corruption  Perception  Index 
Georgia’s score improved slightly from 2.0 to 2.3 (in comparison to a score of 9.5-
9.7 for the best performing countries). 
5.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
When  the  European  Community’s  exceptional  financial  assistance  to  Georgia 
expired at the end of 2004, the Commission launched preparations for a new Council 
Decision to provide further grant assistance to Georgia with a view to supporting the 
government’s economic reforms and helping the country improve debt sustainability. 
Under the exceptional financial assistance, only EUR 31.5 million out of the total 
available grant amount of EUR 65 million was disbursed because of non-compliance 
with  the  conditionality,  notably  the  IMF-supported  economic  program  being  off-
track. The Commission proposed to the Council to make available the remaining 
uncommitted amount of EUR 33.5 million, linked to early principal repayments by 
Georgia. Georgia’s outstanding debt to the Community totalled EUR 85.5 million at 
the end of 2005. 
The  Commission  intends  to  focus  on  public  finance  management  reforms  in  the 
policy conditionality attached to this assistance. In December 2005, the Commission 
(with external experts) conducted a follow-up mission to Tbilisi to update the 2004 
Operational  Assessment  on  financial  circuits  and  administrative  processes  at  the 
Ministry of Finance. Good progress had been made with Treasury reforms so that the 
single treasury account became fully operational in January 2006. A medium-term 
expenditure framework is in early stages of development, requiring strong support 
and  commitment  from  all  participants.  An  accounting  reform  strategy  is  being 
finalised and other second-generation treasury reforms are also underway. External 
and internal audit functions are not clearly defined yet, however. New legislation in 
this  area  is  under  consideration.  Overall,  the  pace  of  the  reforms  has  been 
commendable  in  the  period  following  the  Rose  Revolution.  The  findings  of  the 
mission will inform the Commission in the design of the structural reform criteria for 
disbursements of the new macro-financial assistance. 
On 24 January 2006 the EU Council decided to provide macro-assistance to Georgia 
up to EUR 33.5 million over a two-year period (Decision 2006/41/EC, published in 
the  Official  Journal  of  28  January  2006).  The  first  grant  instalment  will  be 
conditional on the completion of the third review under the IMF-supported economic 
programme (foreseen in spring 2006) and an early debt repayment by Georgia to the 
Community.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation 
No  administratively  set  prices  exist  outside  the  utilities  sector.  Administered  prices 
account for about 5% of the CPI basket. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Liberal trade policy. Georgia has been member of the WTO since June 2002. Based on 
margins allowed at WTO accession Georgia initially raised the number of tariff bands and 
the maximum tariff but then reversed its trade policy in 2005, and further reductions in 
tariffs are planned as of 2007. Non-tariff barriers allowed for environmental, security and 
health reasons only in line with the PCA.  
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
Floating exchange rate of the lari with limited official intervention by the National Bank 
of  Georgia.  No  restrictions  on  current  international  transactions  in  conformity  with 
Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
Adequate overall legislation. Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits. Net inflows of 
FDI 10% of GDP (2004). 
5.  Monetary policy 
Prudent monetary policy has contributed to the stabilisation of the inflation at a low level. 
Dollarisation  of  the  economy  decreased  recently  but  remains  at  around  70%  of  total 
deposits. 
6.  Public finances 
Total fiscal revenues (including grants) estimated at 22% of GDP (2005), of which tax 
revenues  18%  of  GDP. Total  expenditure  and  net  lending  estimated  at  about  24%  of 
GDP). Under the new Budget System Law, which became effective on January 1, 2004, 
the  treasury  system  is  being  reformed,  including  a  full  functioning  Single  Treasury 
Account as of January 2006. A medium-term expenditure framework is being developed. 
A new liberal tax code is effective as of January 1, 2005.  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The  private  sector  accounts  for  about  65%  of  GDP.  Small  scale  privatisation  largely 
completed while large scale privatisation accelerated in 2004-2005 after a standstill. New 
legislation adopted in 2005 on land privatisation. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
There  are  21  operating  banks  (of  which  8  foreign-owned).  Further  consolidation  is 
expected  as  the  minimum  capital  requirement  will  be  increased  to  GEL 12 million 
(approx. EUR 4.6 million) by 2008.  
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6.  MOLDOVA 
6.1.  Executive summary 
The upswing that began in 2000 continued in 2005, as year-on-year GDP growth 
exceeded 7%. Domestic demand fuelled by buoyant remittances from Moldovans 
working abroad continues to drive the economy's expansion.  
Although  exports  grew  strongly,  the  dynamics  of  imports  were  even  more 
pronounced, so that Moldova’s large trade deficit rose further. As a result, the current 
account deficit rose too, reaching around 7% of GDP.  
Inflation that had accelerated sharply on the back of sustained money supply growth 
in 2004-early 2005 moderated gradually to about 10%, reflecting mainly increased 
sterilisation efforts by the National Bank.  
Fiscal policy was loosened in the run-up to parliamentary election in spring 2005; 
however, as at the same time fiscal revenue increased substantially, the surplus of the 
general government account was not put in threat and even widened. This allowed 
the government to set aside some funds in view of a future debt settlement with 
official  creditors  (Moldova  is  still  in  arrears  with  the  Paris  Club  members). 
Reflecting the rise in the GDP and higher debt repayments than new disbursements, 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio has dropped further significantly, to around 26%.  
The implementation of structural reforms accelerated in 2005 following the adoption 
of the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy and of the EU-Moldova 
Action Plan under the Union's European Neighbourhood Policy. New legislation was 
adopted in the areas of business environment and enterprise reform and the financial 
sector, an ambitious public administration reform was launched and some progress 
was  achieved  in  reforming  the  social  protection  system.  At  the  same  time, 
privatisation process has not advanced and very little was done to reform the energy 
sector and the municipal services. Also, corruption remains a matter of concern. 
Moldova received no EC-macro-financial assistance in 2005. Disbursements under 
the  grant  of  EUR 15  million  approved  in  December  2002  could  not  start  in  the 
absence of a working financing arrangement with the IMF. The Council Decision 
providing the legal framework for this operation is no longer valid since December 
2005. 
6.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Moldova's economic recovery continued in 2005, with real GDP growth remaining 
slightly above 7%, which is also the average growth rate in the last five years. Since 
the resumption of growth in 2000, the country’s GDP increased by more than 40%. 
Moldova’s strong growth performance is driven primarily by domestic household 
consumption and construction fuelled by booming workers’ remittances – officially 
recorded to 30% of GDP. Exports continued growing albeit at a slower pace than in 
2004 (an estimated 12.6%, in current dollar terms, against more than 23% in 2004). 
At the same time, imports increased by nearly 30% (again, in value terms), reflecting 
growing imports of consumer goods and higher energy prices. The result of these  
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trends was a substantial widening of the trade deficit, to nearly 38% of GDP (up 
from about 30% in 2003-2004), and of the current account deficit, to more than 7% 
of GDP (from less than 3% in 2004). The strong increase of the remittances – by 
more than one quarter – was clearly not enough to compensate for the worsening of 
the trade balance. 
Inflation accelerated in the last months of 2004 and the first months of 2005 in run-
up to the parliamentary election in spring 2005, reflecting continued large inflows of 
remittances. The twelve-month consumer price index (CPI) increased from below 
11% in October 2004 to 14.2% in April 2005. Later in the year, inflation moderated 
gradually to an end-year figure of some 10%. This was largely the result of a sharp 
increase in the sterilisation efforts by the National Bank of Moldova, supported by 
restrictive  fiscal  policy  (see  below).  The  gradual  easing  of  inflationary  pressures 
allowed a moderate depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of the leu (by a little 
less than 3%, against the US dollar); yet the real effective exchange rate appreciated 
by about 2.5%. The National Bank of Moldova continued accumulating international 
reserves but their level is still well below three months of imports, the medium-term 
target of reserve accumulation in Moldova. For 2006, the National Bank intends to 
put more emphasis on controlling inflation while continuing building up reserves and 
maintaining a competitive exchange rate of the national currency. 
In  2004  the  fiscal  stance  was  loosened  considerably  with  primary  expenditure 
overshooting  considerably  the  budget  plans.  Yet,  as  revenue  performance  also 
exceeded the original budget projections, the budget remained in surplus (of about 
0.7% of GDP). In 2005, fiscal revenue increased further reflecting a sharp rise in the 
revenue from taxation of consumption, primarily of VAT on imported goods. As a 
result,  and  despite  further  increase  in  public  spending,  the  general  government 
surplus widened further, to an estimated 1.5% of GDP. Yet, despite a seemingly 
comfortable fiscal position, Moldova’s public finances situation remains extremely 
fragile given that the country is not servicing in full its external debt obligations. 
While Moldova continued servicing current interest on its debt to the Paris Club (it 
had  resumed  interest  payments  to  the  official  creditors  in  July  2004),  arrears  on 
principal repayments continued to build up. The stock of arrears to the Paris Club at 
the end of 2005 was estimated to about USD 55 million, or more than 2% of GDP. 
The settlement of arrears remains a precondition for restoring Moldova’s relations 
with  the  international  financial  community  after  the  default  of  2002.  Since  the 
resumption of interest payments to the official creditors, the authorities have been 
pursuing a policy aimed at normalising their relations with the creditors. It is in this 
context that they established in 2005 an escrow account in the budget, to be used for 
a future settlement of arrears in the event of a Paris Club agreement. In view of the 
results of the recent talks with the IMF on a new financing arrangement (see below), 
such an agreement seems now within reach.  
Pending  a  possible  Paris  Club  debt  consolidation  agreement,  Moldova  continued 
reducing gradually its external indebtedness. While in the course of 2004, Moldova 
had managed to conclude a number of bilateral debt reduction deals (both with non-
Paris Club official and private creditors), in 2005 the reduction of the stock of the 
external debt was the result of regular principal repayments, not matched by new 
disbursements. It is estimated that at the end of 2005 Moldova’s public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt was below USD 800 million or 26% of GDP (down from 
34% one year earlier and still about 60% in 2002). Non-publicly guaranteed external  
EN  26    EN 
debt is substantially higher – between USD 1.1 and 1.2 billion. A large part of this 
debt – probably over 50% – is the debt, including arrears, for natural gas deliveries 
from Russia. Given the still low level of foreign exchange reserves and the large 
current account deficit, Moldova remains dependent on additional support from the 
IFIs  and  bilateral  donors.  Also,  the  burden  on  the  economy  of  servicing  debts 
remains high – about 20% of exports of goods and services.  
6.3.  Structural reform 
The resumption of economic growth in Moldova in the beginning of the millennium 
coincided  with  a  virtual  standstill  in  structural  reforms.  During  this  period,  the 
government’s  failure  to  achieve  any  significant  progress  in  privatisations  and 
enterprise restructuring and its excessive administrative interference in the economy 
led to a marked deterioration of the business climate. Starting from 2004, however, 
structural  reforms  re-appeared  on  the  government’s  agenda.  Already  in  2004, 
attempts  were  made  to  improve  conditions  for  business  activity  and  SME 
development and attract foreign investment. One important step in this direction was 
the  adoption  of  the  Economic  Growth  and  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  Paper 
(EGPRSP) in May 2004 setting medium-term priorities for government action and 
identifying, among the key prerequisites for sustainable growth, a sound business 
environment.  The  Government’s  renewed  commitment  to  economic  reforms  has 
been reinforced by its stated European aspirations culminating in the adoption in 
early  2005  of  the  EU-Moldova  Action  Plan  in  the  context  of  the  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy.  This  Plan  aiming  at  establishing  an  increasingly  close 
relationship between the EU and Moldova seems to be a very powerful driver for 
reforms.  
Among particular structural policies implemented in 2005, the following should be 
singled out. In the area of business environment and enterprise reform, the main 
effort was in streamlining business regulation under the so-called Guillotine Law. 
The Guillotine Law aims at reviewing more than 1000 business regulations with the 
aim of cancelling most of them and streamlining the rest. Licensing and inspection 
costs have already been reduced substantially and are expected to be cut further when 
the  review  of  the  regulatory  framework  will  be  completed.  In  addition,  the 
Parliament adopted amendments to the company law streamlining the ownership and 
corporate governance regulations. In the area of public enterprise management, the 
only noticeable development was the completion by the government of the inventory 
of the state asset holdings.  
At the same time, the government launched a major public administration reform. 
The  reform  prepared  with  donor  support  consists  in  streamlining  the  public 
administration  and  reforming  the  civil  service  and  aims  at  improving  the 
government's capacity for decision making. It goes in parallel with the continuous 
improvement of the Medium-term Financing Framework (MTFF) aiming at a better 
use  of  government  financial  resources,  an  issue  of  particular  importance  in  the 
context of the financing of the policies spelled out in the EGPRSP. 
In the area of social protection, the government pursued the implementation of the 
pension reform programme. The reform aims at replacing the system based on the 
level  of  wages  by  the  one  based  on  actual  contributions,  while  refraining  from 
introducing new pension privileges. Also, the government initiated the reform of the  
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system  of  social  assistance  benefits  with  the  aim  of  switching  from  the  current 
targeting of specific categories of population to the one based on actual income.  
The financial sector reform and consolidation progressed further, building on the 
recommendations of the Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSAP) completed by 
the  IMF  in  January  2005.  The  FSAP  concluded  that  the  banking  sector  is 
fundamentally sound but identified a number of structural shortcomings, including 
weaknesses in governance related to the government interference and the lack of 
transparency  in  the  ownership  of  banks  and  their  clients.  The  recently  adopted 
amendments to the Law on Financial Institutions aim at correcting some of these 
weaknesses but much still needs to be dome to improve the efficiency of the banking 
sector and open it up to competition from reputable foreign banks. One of the main 
issues that the authorities will need to tackle in the future is the restructuring and 
privatisation of the country's largest financial institution, the Savings Bank (Banca de 
Economii). 
In  several  other  areas  progress  has  been  more  modest.  While  the  trade  regime 
remains fundamentally liberal, there are still formal and mostly informal restrictions 
on  exports  of  some  key  commodities.  The  reforms  of  the  energy  sector  and 
municipal infrastructure have hardly started. The weaknesses of Moldova's energy 
and municipal services regulation were highlighted in late 2005-early 2006 when 
Moldova faced a substantial rise in the price of imports of natural gas from Russia. 
The  corruption  remains  a  serious  concern,  despite  a  perceived  improvement 
(Moldova's  position  in  Transparency  International's  global  Corruption  Perception 
Index has improved). 
6.4.  Implementation of exceptional financial assistance 
Between  1994  and  2000,  the  European  Community  provided  to  Moldova  three 
macro-financial assistance packages in the form of medium-term loans. The first two 
packages worth EUR 45 million and EUR 15 million were disbursed. Moldova has 
so far serviced scrupulously its external financial obligations towards the Community 
and is expected to have repaid the loans in full in 2006. The third MFA loan package 
amounting to EUR 15 million, decided in 2000, was cancelled in December 2002 and 
replaced by a grant of an equivalent amount. However, no disbursements were made 
under the latter in the absence of a working financing arrangement with the IMF. The 
Council Decision providing the legal framework for this operation remained valid 
until December 2005 but has now expired. 
In the beginning of 2006, the Moldova’s authorities reached an agreement with the 
IMF on the parameters of a new financing arrangement under the Fund’s Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The PRGF programme is to be approved by 
the Fund Executive Board in the first half of 2006.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most prices have been liberalised. 
2.  Trade liberalisation  
Relatively liberal international trade policy on paper, but formal or, mostly, informal restrictions on 
some key commodities exist (notably wheat and sunflower seed). Moldova became a member of 
the WTO in June 2000.  
3.  Exchange regime  
The leu is convertible for current account operations. Floating exchange rate. 
4.  Foreign direct investment  
Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits and no limitations on holding foreign currency bank 
accounts. Adequate overall legislation, but implementation is often problematic, which weakens the 
business  climate.  A  new  investment  law  introducing  equal  treatment  of  domestic  and  foreign 
investors adopted in 2004. There had been a trend toward increasing administrative interference on 
foreign investors, notably in the energy sector. FDI, after having declined in 2002-2003, is now 
growing but is still very modest. 
5.  Monetary policy 
After acceleration in inflation in early 2005 reflecting continued large inflow of remittances, the 
National Bank stepped up sterilisation. As a result, inflation moderated gradually. The National 
Bank expected to pursue a tighter policy course aimed at controlling inflation while still continuing 
to accumulate forex reserves. 
6.  Public finances  
Fiscal  stance  improved  in  2005.  Budget  revenue  increased  reflecting  sharp  rise  in  taxation  of 
consumption. As expenditure increase was smaller, the general government surplus widened to 
1.5%  of  GDP.  No  further  widening  of  the  surplus  is  expected  in  2006  given  that  Moldova  is 
expected to need all possible fiscal resources to settle its debt arrears to the Paris Club (about 2% of 
GDP). Public external debt was cut to about 26% of GDP as a result of repayments not matched by 
new lending. Medium-term Financial Framework was further improved. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
Structural reforms have accelerated in several key areas boosted by the start of the implementation 
of  the  EGPRSP  and  the  adoption  of  EU-Moldova  ENP  Action  Plan.  The  simplification  and 
streamlining  of  the  regulatory  environment  of  the  enterprises  has  advanced  through  the 
implementation of the "Guillotine Law". Company law was amended. Yet virtually no progress was 
achieved in privatisation. Other key areas of structural reforms – public administration and social 
protection  reforms  –  progressed.  Yet  business  environment  suffers  from  state  intervention  and 
formal and informal business restrictions.  
8.  Financial sector reform  
The financial sector is in a relatively good shape, but further strengthening is crucial to mobilize 
savings  and  promote  investment.  Amendments  to  the  banking  legislation  adopted  in  2005  to 
improve governance through better transparency in ownership.   
EN  29    EN 
 
7.  SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO  
7.1.  Executive summary 
The  economic  performance  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  has  been  robust  in  2005 
driven by strong gains in trade, transportation, financial services and construction. 
GDP in Serbia is estimated to have grown by 6.5% year-on-year for the whole year 
and in Montenegro by 3.8% in the first nine months of 2005. Inflation in Serbia 
accelerated and reached 17.5%, while it stood at 2.4% in Montenegro. Fiscal policy 
has again been tightened in Serbia, and the consolidated general budget is projected 
to have reached a surplus of 1.1% of GDP. The external sector remains vulnerable 
given the country’s weak export performance. However, strong FDI inflows have 
somewhat eased financing requirements. In both Republics, the reform momentum 
has  again  been  strong  in  2005  and  in  Serbia,  the  share  of  the  private  sector  is 
estimated to have increased to 55% of GDP as privatisation and restructuring of the 
enterprise  sector  has  been  progressing.  A  Supplemental  Memorandum  of 
Understanding,  laying  out  the  economic  policy  conditions  attached  to  an 
EUR 70 million additional macro-financial assistance, was signed on 29 November 
2005  and  the  first  tranche  grant  component  of  EUR 25  million  was  paid  in  late 
December 2005. The payment of the first tranche loan component of EUR 15 million 
was delayed pending ratification of the Loan Agreement by the Federal Parliament. 
7.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Serbia 
In 2005, Serbian GDP is estimated to have grown by 6.5% year-on-year driven by 
strong gains in trade, transportation, financial services and construction, more than 
offsetting a drop in agricultural output. Industrial production grew at a modest 1.3% 
for the whole year, while showing a robust recovery in the second half of the year. 
Inflation remained at double digits throughout the year and stood at 17.5% year-on-
year  in  December,  mainly  driven  by  strong  domestic  demand,  increases  in 
administered prices, the rising cost of fuel imports and the one-off effect of VAT 
introduced in January 2005, but was also aggravated by the exchange rate indexation 
of prices. 
Fiscal policy has been further tightened in 2005 and the consolidated general budget 
is projected to have reached a surplus of 1.1% of GDP, reflecting prudent budget 
execution amid lower than expected revenues, and measures to curb down subsidies 
and transfers. Monetary policy has been challenged to stem the rapid expansion of 
broad  money  and  robust  credit  growth,  as  substantial  capital  inflows  created 
appreciation  pressure.  Foreign  exchange  market  interventions  by  the  NBS  have 
boosted money market liquidity, which was only insufficiently sterilised. 
The current account deficit of Serbia has narrowed to 10.2%, based on strong export 
growth in the first half of the year and subdued import growth despite rising world 
oil prices. Nevertheless, exports remained at about half of imports in absolute terms. 
The financial account substantially improved on surging foreign direct investment  
EN  30    EN 
(FDI) and increased access to foreign loans. FDI surged to 7.7% of GDP, and foreign 
borrowing, mostly  by the private sector, has increased to 7.6% of GDP. Foreign 
exchange reserves have risen to USD 5.9 billion or 5.2 months of imports. External 
debt-to-GDP remained high at about 61%. Debt service increased to 6.6% of GDP 
and is projected to rise further in coming years. 
Montenegro 
In Montenegro, real GDP rose by 3.8% in the first nine months of 2005, reflecting 
upwards trends by 1.3% in industrial output (mining and processing industry). Retail 
sales turnover went up by 11.7%, while the construction sector recorded an increase 
of 11%. In 2005 the budget deficit was 2.8% of GDP. 
The current account deficit widened in the third quarter of 2005 to EUR 42.3 million 
(3.6% of GDP for the period). The major factor for the gap widening was the strong 
expansion of the trade deficit, which increased for the same period by 34% (EUR 
355.4 million). The reasons were the low competitiveness of domestic products, the 
higher prices and strong imports of crude oil derivatives (58% of total imports for the 
period January-September), and the decrease of the prices of the main exports items 
of the country (aluminium and steel). Moreover, surpluses in the services account 
(21.2%) and the current transfers balance (9.7%), due to growing tourism activity 
and rising workers remittances, were not sufficient to alleviate the current account 
deficit.  Net  foreign  direct  investment  reached  EUR  360.4  million  by 
November 2005, a size which is not expected to recur, reflecting the privatisation in 
2005 of the state most attractive assets (Telekom Montenegro, Podgorica Aluminium 
Plant, and Podgorica Banka). 
By  September  2005,  external  debt  had  decreased  to  30.6%  of  GDP 
(EUR 503.4 million), from a level of 31.8% in end 2004.  
7.3.  Structural Reforms 
Serbia 
Reform momentum has again been strong in 2005. The share of private sector is 
estimated to have increased by 5 percentage points to 55% of GDP. However, a large 
share of resources is still held in uncompetitive activities in the public and socially 
owned sectors, lowering the growth potential. Privatisation of the socially owned 
companies progressed. Over 100 companies have also been declared insolvent under 
the new bankruptcy law which entered into force in February 2005. Restructuring of 
the public enterprises progressed with the spin-off of about 100 non-core companies 
and  assets  as  well  as  the  reduction  in  overstaffing.  The  restructuring  of  network 
industries, such as the energy, telecommunications and transport sector is still in its 
initial  phase.  There  was  some  progress  in  the  creation  of  a  necessary  regulatory 
framework and establishment of well-equipped regulatory agencies for these sectors. 
Bank  privatisation  proceeded  successfully  and  supervision  improved,  but  the 
increase in non-performing loans is of concern. The privatisation of four state banks 
helped raise the share of foreign bank ownership to 63% by end-September. The 
capital adequacy ratio was increased from 10 to 12% and a new banking law aligning 
current practises towards Basel Core Principles was adopted.  
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Montenegro 
The government launched an ambitious project for the restructuring of 97 companies 
to be either privatised or liquidated, and their assets sold. Major privatisation deals 
took place in 2005 with the sale of Telekom Montenegro, the aluminium producer 
KAP and Podogoricka  Banka. The share of foreign capital in the banking sector 
increased in 2005 with several majority or minority shares purchases. A bank merger 
between NLB Montenegrobanka and Euromarket Bank was the first operation of this 
type in the republic. The volume of trade on the two Montenegrin stock exchanges 
increased sharply in 2005, reaching EUR 198.5 million, more than four times the 
total volume in 2004 (EUR 43 million).  
7.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Following a first EUR 345 million assistance package implemented in 2001/2002, 
the  Council  adopted  on  5  November  2002  a  Decision  (Council 
Decision 2002/882/EC)  to  provide  further  EC  macro-financial  assistance  to  the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an amount of up to EUR 130 million to underpin 
economic  policies  in  the  context  of  the  three-year  IMF  Extended  Arrangement 
(2002-2005) approved in May 2002 and to support the balance of payments. Of this 
assistance, EUR 55 million were in the form of a loan and EUR 75 million in grant. 
A  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  was  signed  in  December 2002  which 
specified the economic policy conditions and structural measures for the release of 
the second and the third tranche of this assistance. The first tranche, comprising of 
EUR  10  million  in  loan  and  EUR 30  million  in  grant,  and  the  second  tranche, 
comprising of EUR 30 million in loan and EUR 35 million in grant, were paid in 
spring and fall 2003, respectively. The disbursement of the third and last tranche was 
delayed due to lack of progress in the implementation of structural reforms. After 
additional  reform  progress  in  2004,  the  third  tranche  was  released  and  the  grant 
element of EUR 10 million was paid in December 2004. The payment of the loan 
element of EUR 15 million was completed in March 2005.  
In  June  2004,  the  Commission  has  carried  out  operational  assessments  of  the 
financial circuits and procedures in the Ministries of Finance and the central Banks 
of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  with  the  assistance  of  an  external  consultant.  These 
assessments  concluded  that  despite  some  weaknesses  of  the  administrative 
procedures  in  the  Ministries  of  Finance,  a  framework  for  sound  financial 
management at both authorities is effective. 
On 25 November 2003, the Council further decided (Council Decision 2003/825/EC) 
to  increase  the  current  macro-financial  assistance  to  up  to  EUR 200  million  to 
address additional external financing needs identified by the IMF. In December 2004 
the Council extended the legal basis of this assistance until 30 June 2006 (Council 
Decision 2004/862/EC). This additional assistance of EUR 70 million comprises a 
EUR 25 million loan and a EUR 45 million grant. It is available in two tranches of 
EUR 40 million and EUR 30 million, respectively. A Supplemental Memorandum of 
Understanding (SMoU) laying out the economic policy conditions attached to this 
additional  assistance  was  signed  on  29  November.  The  first  grant  tranche  of 
EUR 25 million was released in December 2005 upon satisfactory compliance with 
conditionality requirements as defined in the SMoU. The payment of the loan tranche  
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of EUR 15 million was delayed beyond the end of the year, pending ratification of 
the Loan Agreement by the Federal Parliament.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most price categories are liberalised except for some public services and utilities. Energy prices are being 
gradually adjusted towards cost recovery levels in both Republics. In 2005, further adjustments in electricity 
prices took place to bring them close to cost recovery levels, contributing to a resumption of inflation.  
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Further regional trade liberalisation is ensured by the ratification of a number of free trade agreements that 
SCG  concluded  with  the  neighbouring  countries  under  the  Stability  Pact  initiative.  Substantial,  but 
incomplete harmonisation of tariff rates of Serbia and Montenegro took place, with an attempt to create an 
internal market between the two republics. However, no agreement on the harmonisation of agricultural 
tariffs, alignment of import levies and a vast of non-tariff barriers has been reached. Consequently, two 
separate applications for WTO membership have been submitted. 
3.  Exchange regime 
Serbia applies a managed floating exchange rate regime under which the nominal exchange rate was kept 
stable in 2001 and 2002 resulting in a substantial real appreciation during that period, though from a probably 
undervalued  level  at  end-2000.  In  2004,  the  National  Bank  of  Serbia  allowed  for  a  stronger  nominal 
depreciation to preserve the economy’s competitiveness. In 2005, the degree of nominal depreciation was 
slowed  despite  pressures  towards  appreciation  from  large  capital  inflows,  reflecting  a  trade-off  between 
inflation and current account objectives. In Montenegro, following the unilateral introduction of the German 
mark in 1999, the euro is now the sole legal tender in the republic. 
4.  Foreign Direct Investment 
Appropriate legislation as well as a foreign investment promotion agency is in place. FDI is largely related to 
large privatisation deals; greenfield and portfolio investments remain low. In 2005, FDI is expected to have 
increased to 7.7% of GDP, consisting mainly of privatisation revenues and amounting to EUR 1,255 million 
and EUR 630 million to Serbia and Montenegro, respectively. 
5.  Monetary policy 
In Serbia, the execution of a stability-oriented monetary policy in 2005 was hindered by the high euroisation 
of the economy and strong capital inflows. Annual inflation accelerated to 17.5% in 2005, mainly driven by 
strong domestic demand, increases in administered prices, rising cost of fuel imports and the one-off effect of 
the VAT introduced in January 2005. In Montenegro, given the adoption of the euro as sole legal tender, the 
scope for an independent monetary policy is limited and annual inflation reached 3.4% in 2005. 
6.  Public Finance 
In Serbia, fiscal policy was contractionary in 2005, also in cyclically-adjusted terms. This has helped to 
contain domestic demand and contributed to an improvement of external accounts. VAT was introduced in 
January 2005 and has helped to bolster revenues. 
7.  Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
Privatisation efforts in Serbia remained high in 2005. However, the restructuring of large socially owned 
enterprises  and  public  utilities  is  still  at  an  early  stage.  In  Montenegro,  the  privatisation  of  the  giant 
aluminium  factory and of the telecommunication company  was completed in 2005 and boosted Foreign 
Direct Investment. 
8.  Financial Sector Reform 
Banking  supervision  has  been  strengthened  in  both  republics.  The  process  of  bank  restructuring  and 
privatisation in Serbia continued in 2005. Six previously state-owned banks have been offered for tender sale 
and four of those have been sold by year end 2005. In Montenegro, the privatisation of the last state-owned 
bank (Podgorica Banka) was completed in 2005.   
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8.  TAJIKISTAN 
8.1.  Executive summary 
Tajikistan’s economy has continued to grow strongly last year, recording 7.5% real 
GDP growth. The government budget surplus has been estimated at 0.1% in 2005 (a 
surplus has been recorded for the third consecutive year) and Tajik external debt has 
fallen to less than 40% of GDP. Annual average inflation in 2005 is estimated to 
have remained at about 7%. The current account deficit in 2005 is estimated to have 
narrowed from 4% of GDP in 2004 to 3.6% in 2005. 
Satisfactory results are noted in the area of structural reforms. Implementation of the 
new simplified Tax and Customs Code, an improved VAT administration and the 
increase  in  VAT  collection  on  imports  -  following  a  switch  to  the  destination 
principle  in  intra-CIS  trade  –  have  contributed  to  a  rise  in  tax  collection.  In  the 
framework  of  the  privatisation  strategy  2003-2007,  an  external  audit  of  the  gas 
distribution  company  (Tajikgaz)  was  completed  in  February 2005  by  a  Russian 
external audit company acceptable to the World Bank and the IMF. Progress was 
made in the issuance of land use certificates. In addition, an agricultural debt strategy 
has  been  worked  out  by  the  Tajik  authorities  and  the  donor  community, 
complemented  by  an  action  plan  for  implementation.  The  minimum  capital 
requirement for banks has been raised from USD 1.5 million to USD 5 million. Non-
complying banks are closed down or merged with other banks.  
A final (fifth) grant instalment of EUR 7 million under the Exceptional Financial 
Assistance (EFA) to Tajikistan will be disbursed if the related conditionality is met 
and after Tajikistan has made a fourth early debt repayment of EUR 8 million. The 
review process is ongoing. 
8.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Tajikistan’s  economy  has  continued  to  grow  strongly  in  2005.  Continued  robust 
inflows of workers' remittances have boosted retail trade, but growth in agriculture 
and industry has decelerated. Real GDP growth of 7.5% is estimated for the full year, 
compared to 10.6% in 2004.  
Tax collection as a ratio to GDP has increased from 14.9% in 2003 to 15.2% in 2004 
and to an estimated 16% in 2005. A key factor contributing to this upward trend is an 
improved  VAT  administration  and  the  increase  in  VAT  collection  on  imports 
following a switch to the destination principle in intra-CIS trade. Nevertheless, the 
government budget surplus has narrowed from 0.9% of GDP in 2003 to 0.7% in 
2004 and to an estimated 0.1% in 2005. Increased revenue has been more than offset 
by a rise in spending in areas such as health and education.  
The National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) has maintained a relatively tight monetary 
policy in 2005 to keep inflation under control. However, weak institutional capacity, 
the expected fiscal loosening and the undeveloped nature of Tajikistan's financial 
sector have continued to constrain the NBT's conduct of monetary policy. Inflation 
has been pushed up by rises in domestic utility tariffs, increases in public sector 
salaries,  pensions  and  the  minimum  wage,  ongoing  robust  inflows  of  workers'  
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remittances contributing to growth in domestic demand and high fuel prices. Annual 
average inflation in 2005 is therefore estimated to have remained at about 7%. 
At end-2003, total external debt amounted to USD 1 billion (73% of GDP) of which 
30% was owed to the largest creditor Russia. In October 2004, a bilateral agreement 
was  signed,  writing  off  $242  million  out  of  Tajikistan’s  bilateral  debt  towards 
Russia.  Tajikistan  would  settle  the  remainder  of  the  debt  by  31  December  2008 
through a debt-to-equity swap (by giving Russia a share in a major hydropower plant 
under construction). This agreement implies that the Tajik external debt has fallen to 
USD 700 million or less than 40% of GDP. 
Tajikistan’s trade deficit has increased from 7% of GDP in 2004 to about 12% in 
2005. This is due to deterioration in the country’s terms of trade reflecting higher 
import  prices  for  oil/gas  and  weaker  export  cotton  prices,  coupled  with  a  rapid 
growth in consumer imports and a lower volume of cotton exports. Nevertheless, the 
current account deficit in 2005 is estimated to have narrowed from 4% of GDP in 
2004  to  3.6%  in  2005.  This  is  mainly  a  result  of  the  rapid  growth  in  foreign 
remittances, having increased by almost 50% from their 2004 level. 
8.3.  Structural reforms 
A new privatisation strategy for 2003-07 was approved in November 2003. State-
owned enterprises, with a few exceptions, will be privatised, restructured (if direct 
privatisation  is  not  feasible)  or  liquidated.  A  group  of  37  large  and  strategic 
enterprises  will  be  dealt  with  individually,  with  specific  privatisation  and 
restructuring programmes to be developed for each. This list includes the aluminium 
smelter Tadaz, the electric power company BarkiTajik, the state telecom company 
Tajiktelecom, the state railway monopoly Tajikrail and the national airline carrier 
Tajikair. In the framework of the strategy, an external audit of the gas distribution 
company (Tajikgaz) was completed in February 2005. It has been conducted by a 
Russian external audit company, acceptable to the World Bank and the IMF, who 
identified major accounting deficiencies that need to be addressed. 
Progress  was  made  in  the  issuance  of  land  use  certificates.  In  2004,  35,000 
certificates - representing 75,000 ha of land - have been issued and distributed to 
280,000 farmers. During the first half of 2005, 70,000 certificates have been issued, 
of which 36,000 were actually distributed. However, progress in farm privatisation 
has been hindered by the indebtedness of state-owned farms. State farms – mainly in 
the cotton sector - have accumulated about USD 220 million in debt (close to 10% of 
GDP), mostly owed to private foreign creditors. The private debt burden alone is 
equivalent to 130% of cotton exports. In January 2004, the government agreed to 
write off USD 80 million in state debt. In addition, an agricultural debt strategy has 
been  worked  out  last  year  by  the  Tajik  authorities  and  the  donor  community, 
complemented by an action plan for implementation. A first pillar of the action plan 
considers urgent measures to address the debt issue, while a second part deals with 
long term development of the agricultural sector. 
The minimum capital requirement for large banks has been raised from USD 1.5 
million in 2004 to USD 5 million as from 1st January 2005. Small banks have to 
meet the requirement since end-2005. The National Bank of Tajikistan (NBT) has 
become stricter on banks that do not comply with regulations. They are closed down  
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or  merged  with  other  banks.  Commercial  bank’s  compliance  with  International 
Accounting Standards (IAS) is considered to be satisfactory. 
8.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Tajikistan  has  benefited  from  an  assistance  package  which  consists  of  a  loan  of 
EUR 60 million (disbursed in March 2001) and a total grant amount of up to EUR 35 
million to be disbursed in successive annual instalments. 
In June 2004, an operational assessment of the reliability of financial circuits and 
procedures has been carried out with the assistance of an external consultant; the 
main  weaknesses  detected  concern  mainly  the  organisation  of  the  Ministry  of 
Finance and the independence of the control bodies. Nevertheless this assessment 
concluded that a framework for sound financial management is effective. 
As  Tajikistan  has  made  satisfactory  progress  in  macroeconomic  policies  and  in 
structural reform, it has benefited from maximum annual grant instalments totalling 
EUR 28 million so far. On the other hand, the EC has not pushed for the maximum 
annual  debt  repayments which  the  MoU  would  have  allowed.  In 2001,  2002  and 
2005, Tajikistan was asked to repay EUR 8 million only, whereas the MoU would 
have allowed requesting EUR 12 million. Tajikistan’s outstanding debt to the EC is 
now  EUR  36  million.  A  final  (fifth)  grant  instalment  of  EUR  7  million  will  be 
disbursed if the related conditionality is met and after Tajikistan has made a fourth 
early debt repayment of EUR 8 million. The review process is ongoing.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most prices are liberalised (with the exception of public utilities). 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Relatively liberal trade system with persistent non-tariff barriers. Import tariffs were unified at 5% 
in May 2002. Tajikistan has applied for membership in the WTO (observer status since 2001). The 
Eurasian  Economic  Community  (including  Russia,  Belarus,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz  Republic  and 
Tajikistan) aims at promoting regional economic co-operation. 
3.  Exchange regime 
Relatively liberal exchange regime. The official exchange rate was unified with the curb market 
rate in July 2000 when an interbank foreign exchange market began operating. The new currency, 
somoni, was introduced in October 2000. A managed floating regime of the somoni is in place. 
4.  Foreign Direct Investment 
Modest foreign direct investment due to Tajikistan’s small market, lack of regional integration, 
slow  pace  of  privatisation,  limited  access  to  financing,  weakness  of  public  administration  and 
corruption. FDI inflows were around 2% of GDP in 2003 and 1.5% in 2005. In 2004, FDI/GDP 
was exceptionally high at 13% because of the debt-for-equity swap with Russia. 
5.  Monetary policy 
A Monetary Policy Committee was set up in 2003, which should lead to a more effective monetary 
policy. A decree was issued the same year, withdrawing lending authority from all National Bank 
branch managers, department heads and deputy chairpersons. It should stop the practice of directed 
credits from the NBT to the cotton sector. 
6.  Public Finance 
Total tax collection of the general government has increased from 14.9% of GDP in 2003 to 15.2% 
in  2004  and  further  to  an  estimated  16%  in  2005.  This  increase  is  mainly  due  to  improved 
administration of the VAT, including completion of the transition to the destination principle. 
7.  Privatisation and Enterprise Restructuring 
A  new  privatisation  strategy  for  2003-07  was  approved  in  November  2003.  State-owned 
enterprises, with a few exceptions, will be privatised, restructured (if direct privatisation is not 
feasible) or liquidated. In the framework of the strategy, an external audit of the gas distribution 
company (Tajikgas) was completed in February 2005 by an audit company acceptable to the IMF 
and the World Bank. 
8.  Finanial Sector Reform 
A  reduction  in  transfer  fees  was  decided  and  progress  has  been  made  in  improving  banking 
regulation and supervision. This has encouraged more Tajik workers to use the banking system to 
remit wages earned abroad. The minimum capital requirement for commercial banks has been 
raised from US$ 1.5 million to US$ 5 million. Non-complying banks are closed down or merged 
with other banks. Compliance with IAS is considered to be satisfactory.  
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9.  UKRAINE 
9.1.  Executive summary 
Real GDP growth was modest at 2.6% in 2005 (12.1% in 2004) mainly because of 
weaker external demand for Ukraine’s steel exports and sluggish investment activity 
under  an  uncertain  government  policy  environment.  The  trade  balance  turned 
negative and the current account surplus of 10.5% (2004) was halved. Although the 
fiscal deficit was contained at below 3% of GDP (4.4% in 2004), inflation continued 
to  be  fuelled  by  increases  in  public  expenditure  on  pensions,  wages  and  social 
transfers,  in  particular  as  the  supply  side  response  was  constrained.  Average 
consumer price inflation for 2005 reached 13.5% (9.0% for 2004). 
Notwithstanding its overall reform orientation, the new Government nominated after 
president Yuschenko’s election victory was marred by internal disputes and lacked 
coherence  in  economic  policy-making.  The  government  pursued  WTO  accession 
actively  but  the  parliament  continued  to  oppose  key  economic  legislation.  In 
December 2005, the EU granted Ukraine a market economy status for anti-dumping 
purposes. 
Ukraine’s precautionary stand-by arrangement (SBA) with the IMF expired at the 
end of March 2005 (in fact off-track since the autumn 2005 due to slippages in fiscal 
policy),  and  the  country did  not  pursue  active  discussions  with the  Fund  on  any 
successor arrangement. Accordingly, the EC’s macro-financial assistance (decided in 
2002)  continued  to  be  on  hold  in  case  Ukraine’s  external  financial  situation 
deteriorates so that it decides to request access to IMF resources. 
9.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
A  negative  terms-of-trade  shock  (import  prices  of  energy  increasing while  world 
market prices on metal exports tumbled), combined with sluggish investment under 
an uncertain government policy environment, led to a hard landing with a real GDP 
growth rate of 2.6% in 2005. This is the lowest growth rate registered since 2000 
when economic recovery started in Ukraine, resulting in an average real GDP growth 
rate of 8.4% in 2000-2004. On production side, the deceleration of growth last year 
derived from a reduction in value added in construction and trade (respectively -6.7% 
and -8.5%) and a modest growth in manufacturing (3.0%) and agriculture (0.4%). 
The recorded negative growth in trade is attributed to the elimination of artificial 
wholesale schemes while retail trade continued to grow, boosted by a strong increase 
in real incomes (about 20% year-on-year). Metal production and machine building 
were  most  badly  affected  by  the  slowdown,  while  food  and  chemical  industries 
enjoyed  more  stable  growth.  Private  consumption  was  driving  the  growth  as  net 
exports turned negative in 2005. Investment/GDP ratio declined to 19%, exacerbated 
by cuts in planned public investments.  
Average consumer price inflation was 13.5% in 2005 (9.0% in 2004). The 12-month 
inflation  decelerated  somewhat  towards  the  end  of  the  year,  reaching  10.3%  in 
December (14.4% in mid-2005). The CPI has a large share of food products; neither 
domestic  supply  nor  imports  did  meet  increase  in  demand  following  the 
government’s expansionary fiscal policy, under which increases pensions, wages and  
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social  benefits  continued.  Increases  in  utility  and  transportation  tariffs  added  to 
inflation. 
The trade balance turned negative last year and the current account surplus of 10.5% 
(2004)  is  estimated  to  have  narrowed  to  below  5%  of  GDP.  Exports  of  goods 
increased  by  5%  (37%  in  2004),  and  imports  by  25%  (26%  in  2004).  As  China 
became a net exporter of steel last  year, world market prices for Ukraine’s most 
important  export  commodity  declined.  Other  factors  contributing  to  the  negative 
trade balance were higher oil prices, appreciation of hryvnia (in nominal and real 
terms), liberalisation of imports of consumer goods and robust growth in households’ 
disposable incomes. 
The central government’s fiscal deficit was somewhat below 2% of GDP (below 3% 
for the general government according to preliminary estimates) as revenue collection 
met the budgeted target and expenditures were executed below the budgeted plan. 
Strong tax revenue collection (tax revenues increasing from 30% of GDP in 2004 to 
around 34% of GDP last year) helped to reverse the widening of the deficit (from a 
deficit  of  -4.4%  in  2004).  On  the  other  hand,  the  increased  tax  burden  risks 
maintaining  economic  activities  in  the  shadow.  The  Pension  Fund’s  expenditures 
doubled in 2005 following increases in minimum pensions so that pension outlays as 
a percentage of GDP are among the highest in the world at nearly 16%. Transfers 
from the state budget covered the Pension Fund’s deficit of around 4% of GDP. The 
Pension Fund’s imbalance is also effectively constraining efforts to reduce payroll 
taxes.  
Ukraine’s public external debt of USD 13 billion is, however, at a sustainable level 
of about 16 percent of GDP. The gross international reserves of the National Bank of 
Ukraine (NBU) doubled in 2005 (USD 19.4 billion as of December 2005) mainly as 
result  of  privatisation-related  capital  inflows  in  the  last  quarter  of  2005.  The 
international  reserves  cover  about  5  months  of  imports.  The  NBU  continued 
interventions in the interbank market to maintain the de facto peg of the hryvnia to 
the  US  dollar  (at  5.05  hryvnia  per  dollar)  following  the  5-percent  nominal 
revaluation in April 2005. 
In  September  President  Yushchenko  dismissed  the  first  post-Orange  Revolution 
government  led  by  Tymochenko,  which  was  marred  by  internal  divisions.  The 
political  situation  remained  uncertain  in  anticipation  of  the  March 2006 
parliamentary  elections  and  the  parliament’s  no-confidence  vote  on  the 
Yekhanurov’s  government  in  the  beginning  of  2006  added  to  the  pre-election 
tensions. The rating agencies, however, maintained Ukraine’s sovereign rating at BB 
(with stable outlook) supported by low government debt and good external liquidity. 
The  short-term  macroeconomic  challenges  to  be  addressed  immediately  after  the 
March  elections  include  bringing  inflation  to  single  digits  and  putting  in  place  a 
sustainable fiscal framework. The external balance is vulnerable to a further fall in 
metal and other export prices in addition the impact of higher gas prices on imports.  
9.3.  Structural reforms 
The  stated  intentions  of  new  Government  to  improve  the  business  climate  were 
effectively  undermined  by  questions  such  as  the  extent  of  “re-privatisation”  
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(reacquisition  and  resale  of  privatised  assets  which  had  been  sold  under  non-
transparent deals to insiders) while adoption of key  economic legislation such as 
Joint Stock Company Law was pending in the parliament. The persistent problems 
with the VAT refunds to exporters were tackled and the outstanding stock of arrears 
was reduced while a more transparent management of the VAT refund system needs 
to be put in place.  
In December 2005, the European Commission concluded that Ukraine had met the 
technical  criteria  for  a  market  economy  status  in  the  context  of  anti-dumping 
investigations.  This  decision  followed  commitments  by  the  government  on  non-
interference  in  pricing  mechanisms  and  clarifications  on  the  application  of 
bankruptcy legislation. Ukraine has made progress with its accession to the WTO by 
signing bilateral protocols on market access with some 40 WTO members (including 
the EU and also the United States in early 2006). Ukraine is now aiming at joining 
the  WTO  in  2006.  The  parliament  approved  several  important  pieces  of  new 
legislation  to  meet  WTO  accession  requirements  (such  as  on  protection  of 
intellectual  property  rights)  while  some  significant  bills  were  blocked  by  vested 
interest  so  that  the  legislative  programme  for  WTO  accession  remains  to  be 
completed by the new parliament after the March 2006 elections. 
The  acquisitions  of  the  Kryvorizstahl  steel  plant  and  the  Aval  Bank  by  foreign 
investors boosted foreign direct investment in 2005, which reached a record total of 
USD  7.3  billion.  The  cumulative  FDI  inflows  (1989-2005)  in  per  capita  terms 
increased from USD168 to USD 349 in one year. Pre-occupied by the review of past 
privatisations, the government made only modest progress with new privatisation 
deals in particular as the parliament barred potential deals. 
In 2005 the NBU took steps to liberalise foreign currency regulations. In April the 
mandatory sale of 50% of export proceeds was dismantled. In September inter-bank 
foreign  currency  trading  was  further  liberalised  and  a  forward  market  was 
established. Nevertheless, a duty of 1.5% on non-cash currency exchange operations 
(collected for the pension fund) impinged on the market’s further development. New 
legislation was proposed to allow branches of foreign banks to operate more freely in 
Ukraine. The interest among EU banks to enter the Ukrainian market is increasing. 
Fight against corruption and a public administration reform were important priorities 
for the authorities in 2005, starting with the customs administration. According to the 
Transparency  International’s  2005  Corruption  Perception  Index  Ukraine’s  score 
increased from 2.2 in 2004 to 2.6 (in comparison to a score of 9.5-9.7 for the best 
performing  countries)  which  improved  its  ranking  from  122  to  107  (among  159 
countries  surveyed  in  total).  Businesses  report  that  tax  administration  and  the 
regulatory burden are main obstacles for doing business in Ukraine. 
9.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
The  ECOFIN  Council  adopted  in  July  2002  a  decision  granting  a  new  loan  to 
Ukraine  under  the  EC’s  macro-financial  assistance  in  the  amount  of 
EUR 110 million while cancelling the non-disbursed part (EUR 92 million) of the 
1998 loan facility. However, in view of the strong improvement of its balance of 
payments  thereafter,  Ukraine  did  not  have  any  residual  financing  needs,  and 
therefore the new loan has not been disbursed by the EC. This improvement in the  
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external situation was also reflected in Ukraine’s decision to treat the IMF stand-by 
arrangement (SBA) as precautionary, and Ukraine has not drawn any funds under 
this  arrangement  which  expired  at  the  end  of  March 2005.  Ukraine’s  external 
liquidity remained good in 2005, and the country did not pursue discussions with the 
IMF on a successor programme. 
The Commission has adopted a precautionary approach vis-à-vis the macro-financial 
assistance  to  Ukraine.  The  EC  loan  would  be  kept  on  hold  in  case  a balance  of 
payments financing need emerges later and Ukraine decides to use IMF resources. 
The July 2002 Council decision providing the legal framework for this operation will 
remain in force and the Commission stands ready to reactivate this assistance should 
the need arise in the future. Ukraine’s outstanding debt to the Community decreased 
by EUR 57 million in 2005 to a total of EUR 118 million.  
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Summary Status of Economic Reform 
1.  Price liberalisation 
Most  prices  have  been  liberalised.  Communal  service  tariffs  (such  as  gas,  electricity, 
heating  and  rents)  are  subject  administrative  controls  and  tend  to  be  below  full-cost 
recovery levels.  
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Import regimes free of quantitative restrictions wit a few exceptions for health and safety 
reasons. A relatively liberal Customs Code (2001). The trade-weighted effective average 
import tariff is about 7 %. A high degree of dispersion in tariffs between 0 and 70%.  
A few export restrictions remain, namely on sunflower seeds, live animals, cow hides and 
skins, and scrap metals but these will be reviewed upon Ukraine’s WTO accession.  
3.  Foreign exchange regime 
The  exchange  rate  regime  is  classified  as  a  conventional  pegged  arrangement  as  the 
National  Bank  of  Ukraine  maintains  a  de  facto  peg  vis-à-vis  the  USD (at  about  5.05 
hryvnia  after  a  nominal  five-percent  revaluation  in  April  2005).  Full  current  account 
convertibility (Article VIII status at the IMF) since September 1996. There are restrictions 
on all capital account transactions, mainly taking the form of licensing and registering 
requirements.  
4.  Foreign direct investment 
FDI inflows increased in 2005 by USD 7.3 billion to a total of USD 16.3 billion since 
independence which amounts to USD 349 in per capita terms.  
5.  Monetary policy 
The National Bank of Ukraine relies mainly on indirect monetary instruments. Credit to 
commercial  banks  allocated  mostly  through  the  Lombard  facility,  credit  auctions  and 
repossessions. The NBU’s discount rate was increased to 9.5% in August 2005.  
6.  Public finances 
Consolidated government expenditure at about 42.5% of GDP; revenues 39% of GDP of 
which tax revenues 34% (2005). Pension outlays are increasing rapidly, reaching nearly 
16% of GDP.  
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The private sector accounts for 65% of GDP. Privatisation of large enterprises accelerated 
in 2004 albeit under controversial and non-transparent terms. In October 2005 Ukraine’s 
largest  steel  plant  Kryvorizhstal  was  re-auctioned  after  a  court  ruling  determined  its 
privatisation illegal. Overall lack of policy cohesion delayed planned new privatisations.  
8.  Financial sector reform 
Over 150 operating banks of which several weakly capitalised. State-owned banks account 
for about 8% of bank assets and foreign-owned banks for some 12%. New legislation to 
liberalise operations of foreign bank branches underway.   
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10.  ANNEXES  
EN  44    EN 
Annex 1A - COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL AND EXCEPTIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY DATES OF COUNCIL DECISIONS
Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2005 (in millions of euro) 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Structural adjustment loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 190
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
(BOP loan) Jan. 1993 80
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 140
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
(BOP loan) Apr. 1992 185
Israel   (1) 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
(Structural adjustment soft loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
(BOP loan) Aug. 1994 150
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
(BOP grant) Aug. 1993 35
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
(BOP loan) Aug .1996 40
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
(BOP loans) (Suspended)
of which :
    Estonia (40) Mar. 1993 20 (20) (20)
    Latvia (80) Mar. 1993 40 (40) (40)
    Lithuania (100) Jul. 1993 50 (75) (25)
Aug. 1995 25
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
(BOP loan)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 Dec. 1994 25 45
(BOP loan) Aug. 1995 20
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
(BOP loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 Jun. 1995 15 35
(BOP grant) Oct. 1996 20
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 Jul. 1996 130
(BOP loan) (Cancelled)
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
(BOP loan)
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
(BOP loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
(BOP loan)
fYRoM I 22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
(BOP loan) Feb. 1998 15
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
(BOP loan) Dec. 1998 125
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan (2) 17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 287,5 87,5
(Structural adjustment loans and grants)
of which 28.3.00 00/244/EC
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 58 0
Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
June 2004 (grant) 5,5
Dec 2005 ( grant) 1,5
modified by
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   Georgia (175) Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 141,5 33,5
Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan (95) Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 88 7
Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb. 2003 (grant) 7
May 2005 (grant) 7
Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 Jul. 1999 58 58 92
(BoP loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (Cancelled)
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
(BOP loan)
Bosnia I  (3) 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
(BOP loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
(BOP loan) Sep. 2000 60
fYRoM II (4) 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
(BOP loan and grant) 18 Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/900/EC Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec. 2003 (grant) 8
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 Jun. 2000 100 150 50
(BOP loan) July 2003 (loan) 50
Kosovo I (5) 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
(Grant budgetary support) Aug. 2000 15
Montenegro (5) 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2000 13
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
(BOP loan) 19.12.02 02/1006/EC (Cancelled)
Kosovo II (3) 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2002 15
Serbia and Montenegro (ex FRY) I (6) 16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 225 345
(BOP loan and grant) Oct. 2001 35
10.12.01 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 40
Aug. 2002 45
Ukraine IV 12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
(BOP loan)
Serbia and Montenegro II (ex FRY) (7) 05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Fev. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
25.11.03 03/825/EC 70 Dec 2004 (grant) 10 50 20
07.12.2004 04/862/EC
April 2005 (loan) 15
Dec 2005 (grant) 6
Bosnia II (8) 05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Fev. 2003 (grant) 15 50 10
Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
7/12/2004 04/861/EC
Dec 2004 (loan) 10
Jun 2005 (grant) 15
Moldova IV 19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
Albania IV (9) 29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 Nov 2005 (grant) 3 3 22
Georgia II         24.01.06 06/41/EC 33,5 33,5
                                                             ------- ------- -------





(4) Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million.
(5) Exceptional financial assistance.
(6) Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million.
(7) Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
(8) Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
(9) Includes a loan principal amount of € 9million and grants of € 16 million
Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of euro 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of euro 130 million for the grants




Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 20 million and grants of up to € 40 million.
modified by
modified by
Out of the global amount of euro 375 million, maximum amounts of euro 58 million, euro 175 million and euro 95 million were actually agreed with the beneficiary 
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Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2005 (in millions of euro) 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements
A. EU Accession countries
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
(BOP loans) (Suspended)
of which :
    Estonia (40) Mar. 1993 20 (20) (20)
    Latvia (80) Mar. 1993 40 (40) (40)
    Lithuania (100) Jul. 1993 50 (75) (25)
Aug. 1995 25
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 140
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
(BOP loan) Aug .1996 40
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
(BOP loan) Dec. 1998 125
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
(BOP loan) Sep. 2000 60
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
(BOP loan) Mar. 1992 190
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Structural adjustment loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
(BOP loan) Jan. 1993 80
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
(BOP loan) Apr. 1992 185
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
(BOP loan)
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
(BOP loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 Jun. 2000 100 150 50
(BOP loan) July 2003 50
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 Cancelled 130
(BOP loan) (Jul. 1996) Cancelled
------- ------- -------
TOTAL A 3305 2780 525
Annex 1B - COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL AND EXCEPTIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY REGION
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B. Western Balkans
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
(BOP grant) Aug. 1993 35
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 Jun. 1995 15 35
(BOP grant) Oct. 1996 20
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
(BOP loan) ( Cancelled)
Bosnia I  (1) 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
(BOP loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
fYRoM I 22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
(BOP loan) Feb. 1998 15
fYRoM II (2) 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
(BOP loan and grant) Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
10.12.2001 01/900/EC 18 Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec.) 2003 (grant) 8
Kosovo I (3) 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
(Grant budgetary support) Aug. 2000 15
Kosovo II (3) 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2002 15
Montenegro (3) 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2000 13
16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 (grant) 35 345
modified by Oct. 2001 (loan) 225
10.12.2001 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 (grant) 40
Aug.2002 (grant) 45
05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Fev. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
25.11.03 03/825/EC (7) 70 Dec 2004 (grant) 10 50 20
07.12.04 04/862/EC
April  2005 (loan) 15
Dec 2005 (grant) 25
05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Fev. 2003 (grant) 15 50 10
Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
Dec 2004 (loan) 10
07.12.04 04/861/EC June 2005 (grant) 15
29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 Nov  2005 (grant) 3 3 22
TOTAL B 1038 941 97
------- ------- -------
(1)  Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million.
(2)  Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million.
(3) Exceptional financial assistance.
(4)  Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million.
(5) Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
(6) Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
(7) Includes a loan principal amount of € 25 million and grants of € 45 million
(8) Includes a loan principal amount of € 9 million and grants of € 16 million
modified by
Bosnia II (6)





Serbia and Montenegro I 
(ex FRY) (4)
Serbia and Montenegro II 
( ex FRY) (5)
(BOP loan and grant)
Albania IV (8)
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C. New Independent States (NIS)
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan (9) 17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 287,5 87,5
(Structural adjustment loans and grants) modified by
of which 28.3.00 00/244/EC
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 (58) 0
Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Jun 2004( grant) 5,5
Dec 2005(grant) 1,5
   Georgia (175) Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 (141,5) (33,5)
Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec. 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan (95) Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 (88) (7)
Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb 2003 (grant) 7
May 2005 (grant) 7
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 déc-94 25 45
(BOP loan) Aug. 1995 20
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
(BOP loan)
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
(BOP loan) 19.12.02 02/1006 EC (cancelled)
19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
(15)
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
(BOP loan)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
(BOP loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 Jul. 1999 58 58 92
(BoP loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (cancelled)
12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
(15)
Georgia II         21.01.06       06/41/EC 33,5 33,5
------- ------- -------
TOTAL C 1098,5 720,5 378
D. Mediterranean countries
Israel   (10) 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
(Structural adjustment soft loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
(BOP loan) Aug. 1994 150
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
(BOP loan) (Suspended)
------- ------- -------
TOTAL D 787,5 687,5 100
TOTAL A+B+C+D 6229,0 5129,0 1100,0
9)   Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of euro 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of euro 130 million for the grants
        Out of the global amount of euro 375 million, maximum amounts of euro 58 million, euro 175 million and euro 95 million were actually agreed with the beneficiary countries.
beneficiary countries
(10)    Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of ECU 160 million and grants of ECU 27,5 million in the form of interesr subsidies.
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2002 2003 2004 2005
Programme (1) Estimates
GDP at constant prices (Percent change)
Albania 2,9 5,7 5,9 5,5
Armenia 13,2 13,9 10,1 8,0 11,0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5,3 4,0 5,7 5,4
Bulgaria 4,9 4,5 5,6 5,8
FYROM 0,9 2,8 4,1 3,7
Georgia 5,5 11,1 6,2 6,0 8,5
Kosovo -0,1 -0,5 4,1 0,2
Moldova 7,8 6,6 7,3 7,1
Montenegro 1,7 2,3 3,7 4,1
Romania 5,1 5,2 8,3 4,1
Tajikistan 9,1 10,2 10,6 8,0 7,5
Ukraine 5,2 9,6 12,1 6,0 2,6
Consumer price (end year) (Percent change)
Albania 5,2 2,4 2,9 2,5
Armenia 2,0 8,6 2,0 3,0 1,5
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0,3 0,6 0,4 1,0
     Federation -0,2 0,2 -0,3 1,0
     Republika Srpska 1,7 1,8 2,2 1,0
Bulgaria 5,8 2,3 6,1 5,0
FYROM 2,4 1,2 -0,3 1,2
Georgia 5,4 7,0 7,5 5,0 6,2
Kosovo 3,6 1,2 -1,5 -0,8
Moldova 4,4 15,7 12,6 10,0
Montenegro 9,4 6,7 4,3 1,8
Romania 22,8 15,3 11,9 9,0
Tajikistan 14,5 13,7 5,6 7,0 7,0
Ukraine -0,6 8,2 12,3 7,0 10,3
Fiscal balance (Percent of GDP)
Albania -6,6 -4,5 -5,1 -3,8
Armenia  -0,4 -1,1 -1,7 -2,9 -2,4
Bosnia-Herzegovina -4,1 -1,7 -1,9 -1,3
     Federation -0,2 0,4 1,0 -0,6
     Republika Srpska 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Bulgaria -0,2 0,6 1,3 2,3
FYROM -5,6 -0,1 0,7 -0,8
Georgia  -1,9 -1,3 -0,2 -1,9 -2,7
Kosovo 4,0 1,9 -5,4 -2,8
Moldova -1,8 0,7 0,7 1,5
Montenegro -1,8 -4,0 -3,1 -2,4
Romania -2,0 -2,0 -1,4 -1,0
Tajikistan -0,1 0,9 0,7 -0,5 0,1
Ukraine 0,5 -0,9 -4,4 -1,6 -2,9
Current account (Percent of GDP)
Albania -7,2 -5,5 -3,8 -5,5
Armenia -6,2 -6,8 -4,6 -5,1 -3,9
Bosnia-Herzegovina -21,7 -17,7 -17,3 -22,5
Bulgaria -5,6 -9,2 -8,5 -11,8
FYROM -8,4 -3,5 -8,2 -6,5
Georgia -5,8 -7,2 -7,6 -8,1 -9,0
Kosovo 3,0 1,0 -3,9 -9,3
Moldova -4,4 -6,8 -2,7 -5,5
Montenegro -13,0 -7,3 -9,7 -8,6
Romania -3,3 -6,0 -8,4 -8,8
Tajikistan -2,7 -1,3 -4,0 -4,9 -3,6
Ukraine 7,5 5,8 10,5 4,1 4,8
Official foreign exchange reserves (end year) (Months of imports)
Albania 4,4 3,9 4,1 4,1
Armenia 3,7 4 3,6 3,9 4,0
Bosnia-Herzegovina 4,5 5,3 6,1 5,4 6,1
Bulgaria 4,9 4,8 5,3 5,2
FYROM 3,8 3,3 2,9 3,6
Georgia 1,7 1,3 1,7 1,6 1,8
Kosovo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Moldova 1,9 1,7 2,1 2,2
Montenegro n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Romania 3,6 2,8 4,2 5,7
Tajikistan 1,8 1,9 1,8 1,9 1,9
Ukraine 1,9 2,4 2,7 3,9 4,7
(1) Programme targets set in IMF programmes, if any.  
Sources: National authorities and IMF
ANNEX 3: Selected economic indicators
 